

TEL AVIV STATE: A THREAT TO ISRAEL

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Haifa, October 2006

Reuven Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa

This Chair is concerned with issues of national security that contain a spatial expression, such as natural resources and their distribution, population spread, physical infrastructure, and environmental elements.

The Chair publishes position papers, offers consultation to senior decision makers, initiates research projects, hold study days and conferences, publishes books and scholarly works, and assists research students in the fields listed above.

It likewise engages in the proliferation of these matters at high schools and academic institutions.

The Late Reuven Chaikin (1918-2004)

Reuven Chaikin was born in Tel Aviv, and became a senior partner in the Somekh-Chaikin accounting firm. He evinced deep interest in geography and geopolitics, and offered great assistance in these areas at the University of Haifa.

May his memory be for a blessing.

Prof. Arnon Soffer

Holder of the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy

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ABSTRACT

In the 20th century the growth of major cities in the world accelerated, mainly with the entry of motor vehicles as a popular means of transport, and later with the appearance of the airplane. These devices made it possible to skirt provincial towns as places offering services and go straight to the main city. The result is clear: citizens of the world go to and gather at a relatively small number of giant cities at the price of demographic and economic abandonment of the margins (or the so-called periphery). It is not just a matter of demographic enlargement of the cities but of the concentration of economic, social, and cultural forces at a magnitude unknown in the past.

The development of major cities (capitals, core cities, primate cities, and world cities) such as Paris, London, Cairo, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City, in the developed and developing world alike, strikes hard at the national peripheral regions. However, **this process of concentration of the population, and a considerable part of the national forces, in the primate cities in no way harms the sovereignty of states such as France, Britain, Egypt, Argentina, and Mexico - indeed, most of the world's states, because their borders are recognized by the international community and are not challenged in respect of the extent of sovereignty within the state.**

The case of Israel is exceptional because the Israeli core is Jewish-Zionist, and on its periphery there is a relatively large Arab population (for the most part Muslim) which does not identify with the core in the national-political, religious-social-cultural, and economic aspects, and actually regards the Jewish-Zionist state as an enemy that transformed the long-standing (Arab) population from a majority to a minority, humiliated it (destruction of hundreds of settlements, declaration of a military government on those who remained, various deportations and land confiscations), and caused it to be situated on a double periphery, social-economic-political and geographic. Beyond the borders of Israel (recognized and not recognized) a Palestinian population dwells, sister to the Arabs of Israel, and beyond that live hundreds of millions of Arabs akin in religion and nation to the Palestinian people. This reality imparts special meaning to the periphery of Israel and endangers the state's core.

The facts on the ground concern vying for territory and building separate national instruments, and tensions that appear in various garb from time to time (extreme cases have been Land Day of 1976, the events of 1982, and the October 2000

Intifada). Unconnected to the question of who is right - the Jewish side or the Arab side, the issue is the very friction itself, which is increasing between the two populations in every domain and on every matter. The result is that since the beginning of the new Jewish settlement in 1882 (and after) the Jewish center has concentrated on the coastal plane from Haifa to Gedera-Negba, and in recent years has advanced southward to Ashqelon. **All other parts of Israel, the northern coastal plain, the mountainous Galilee, the Yizre'el valley, all the mountain spine (Judea and Samaria, including Jerusalem) and the northern Negev, have been denuded of Jews, or the Jews generally have not reached them, and Jewish sovereignty there is growing constantly weaker.**

In parallel, **throughout the peripheral terrain we have listed the Arab population (especially Muslim) has grown rapidly, in absolute and relative figures, while the Jewish population that has remained there has declined and is weakening economically and socially. The Jewish entity is steadily becoming enclosed in the old-new space from Hadera in the north (Haifa and its environs are likewise subject to continuous retreat) to Ashqelon in the south and to the Jerusalem corridor and western Jerusalem in the east.**

The enfeeblement of the Jewish periphery, and in its wake the collapse of services systems there, stems primarily from the advantages of placement in the core. Another reason is the of Jewish-Arab friction itself. **If this trend continues Israeli will with its own hands realize the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947; or worse still, the Morrison-Grady plan from the early 1940s. It will recede into a narrow space on the coastal strip alone, and life in it will be unbearable because of the density and the chaos.** This is not New York, where there is living space beyond its precincts, or any other dense metropolitan bloc, whose open hinterland is accessible to its residents. This is a narrow space, which cannot defend itself against the hostile Palestinian population, assisted by the hostile Arab domain in the second tier and the third tier, and it matters not a jot if Israel has formal peace agreements with all the states of the region or not.

The conclusion in clear: contrary to any recognized and understood global process, Israel cannot acquiesce in the trends of concentrating in the core at the expense of the periphery, and at the same time hope that the Jewish-Zionist borders of its sovereignty will not gradually crumble, to the point of no return. The hope that the disposition of army camps and training areas can be an answer to this erosion is false, as may be learnt from what is happening in the northern Negev and the north of Israel, and as historical experience all over the world teaches.

Therefore, clear and forthright words must be uttered, even if they are not music to the ears of the dwellers of the Jewish core: **the continued concentration of the Jews in the Tel Aviv core is tantamount to a challenge to the state of Israel (within the Green Line with the various changes in it since 1967). If this process is not stopped, its end will be appalling turmoil for the entire Zionist enterprise because "Tel Aviv State", that state between Hadera and Ashqelon, and in to the Jerusalem corridor, will not be able to exist for long without a hinterland.**

But this process has another facet. As the Jewish population gradually converges into the areas of the core, so the living conditions in it deteriorate, until it becomes a world city of the developing world. A dangerous sub-process of this principle process is that the powerful, the rich, their attendant media, and their sycophant politicians crowd into the islands of wealth and the good life in Savyon, north Tel Aviv, and Herzliya Pituah (see Herzliya Conference), and what you see from here you don't see from those islands. Accordingly, national decision making too is tilted toward the islands of wealth. The frightening thing is that if we do not shake up those islands in good time we will not be able to prevent the disaster inherent in this one-way process.

What can be done to save Israel?

In the geographic domain at least, efforts have to be concentrated in three problematic areas: first of all, to save Jerusalem (yes indeed - to save!) and in the same space to strengthen the Jordan valley. A mighty national effort has to be applied to the northern Negev, accompanied by the mass settlement of Jews around Beer Sheva and within the city (at least one million Jews have to be brought there within a decade or two). Great work is needed throughout the entire north (Jewish, Muslim, Druze, and Christian). To succeed in this mission there is no alternative but to implement a set of solutions for a decade at least (while protecting the law of democracy and without harming private initiative). First of all, national investments in the Tel Aviv area have to end. All the national capital should be directed to the national margins, and among other things **all** the periphery has to be brought close to the Tel Aviv core, and vice versa. A stop has to be put to investing in any public institution that can be moved from the core to the periphery. Every institution supported by the government - theaters, ballet troupes, orchestras, and every cultural and social institution - will be requested to transfer their bases to the periphery (e.g., to the towns of Sderot, Afula, Haifa, Karmiel, Dimona, Beer Sheva, and above all Jerusalem). From there they will travel to appear in greater Tel Aviv. No university or college in the core will receive state help.

All government activities, particularly concerning defense, must be directed to Jerusalem, the capital of Israel. The entire crop of colleges in Herzliya must move to Jerusalem, likewise the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) radio station as well as the IDF spokesperson's office, and in parallel a state regulation has to be promulgated whereby no press conference will be held, and no military person or civil servant will make a public appearance, in the Tel Aviv core, but only in Jerusalem or on the national periphery of Israel.

If all this is accomplished, the function of conferences of the Herzliya type as alternatives to the Knesset (appendix 1) will in any case be eliminated. The media will be obliged to leave Tel Aviv and to spend many days in "hard" places such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Afula, Beer Sheva, and Karmiel. The defense ministry will be required to continue to move its massive forces to the margins, and the city of the training bases, the air force, and military intelligence will be a model to emulate and not the end of a process of spreading out on the periphery.

Everything has to be done to stop a Tel Aviv real-estate invasion of land vacated by the IDF, otherwise the IDF's departure from the center is liable to spur the populating of greater Tel Aviv with some four million more Jews whose place is in Beer Sheva, Haifa, Sderot, Karmiel, Bet She'an and the Jordan valley. To that end it may prove necessary to send home the guild of contemporary national planners (all of them Tel Avivians!) who are responsible for concentrating the entire national effort in the core (National Master Plan 31, National Master Plan 35). In the 1990s those were the people who said that what was good for Tel Aviv was good for Israel, who described the seam line with the West Bank in the Sharon plain as a peaceful environment, and in whose eyes the defensive fence in Gaza was a stage of "from fence to bridge" - all these people must be replaced by Zionist planners, and there is no shortage of those.¹ To succeed in this task the "treasury boys", most of them Tel Aviv child prodigies, must have the national policy dictated to them so that they will act according to it; they must not be those who dictate to the prime minister what he has to do (in the Dan region).

This paper attempts to point out the tendencies that have been described by means of data and analysis of processes, and suggests a strategy to contend with the threatening reality, which adds to a set of processes in which inheres a threat to the existence of Israel in the hostile and fanatic Middle East.

1. We, the authors, are not planners, nor do we have friends who are, and our recommendation is of a national outlook only.





Figure 1: Risks to Israel because of the convergence of Jews into greater Tel Aviv



Map 1: Inward movement to Tel Aviv and its expected cost

CHAPTER ONE

CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN THE WORLD

Major metropolises in the world

The center-periphery phenomenon describes the principal spatial organization in many states, among them Israel. In terms of the nation, the center-periphery perception rests on the assumption that in every state two main domains can be identified, center and periphery, defined by a set of control-dependence relations. The center is the developed domain, which controls the entire national space, and in it are focused political power and control of resources. Most economic activity takes place there, and it concentrates a large and high-quality population; decisions are made in the center for the entire economy. The accumulated capital and the broad economic base of the center are a lodestone for population from all parts of the state, and this migration in turn enlarges the population and intensifies the economic activity. In many states the center area coincides with the main metropolitan area: such is the case in Israel. The metropolis is an extensive urban concentration, a focus for economic, social, and cultural activity, a hub of political and communication power, and a source of innovation and advancement.

The nature of the global economy requires an urban structure of metropolitan style, in which human and physical resources and infrastructures are concentrated, juxtaposed, and joined as a plexus of modern urban functions. This urban structure allows an adequate accumulation of capital, by means of which goods and services are made and traded in local and foreign markets.

Urban societies worldwide are at the zenith of a structural change powered by three defining forces: globalization, information, and accelerated urban spread (Castells, 1996). In practice, these processes link peripheral, backward populations to the urban centers. In fact, the dominance of these urban centers causes deprivation on the periphery to fester (Alfasi and Fenster, 2005).

Collapse of the periphery in the world

The yawning gap between the metropolitan core, or the center, and the periphery in economic activity, wellbeing, array of opportunities before the individual, and

involvement in decision-making processes is a fundamental feature of center-periphery relations. Most states recognize this gap and adopt an active spatial policy to narrow it for fear of harm to their political stability and to their economic development (Gradus, 1996). The threat stems from the intensification of tensions, resulting from economic inequality and social and environmental injustice, between the center and the periphery. These tensions are several times worse when the peripheral population differs in ethnicity or religion from the population at the center. Governments fear that protest on the periphery over social and economic deprivation will spill over into acts of terror, guerrilla operations, and rebellion. Neglect of the periphery may also bring about loss of formal sovereignty on the periphery, and from there, in the case of a disaffected minority population, the road to separatism is short (through irredentism, i.e., attachment to a state across the border, or declaration of independence). Below we shall describe various instances to substantiate this statement.

Dangers to sovereignty in different parts of the world following disintegration of the periphery

The history of various minorities in the world teaches that a minority that constitutes a majority in its territory, and that possesses national consciousness and a national leadership, will do all in its power to realize its national aspirations - by autonomy, irredentism, or destruction of the state from within and taking control of it. In the 20th century disintegration of states, and attempts at disintegration, occurred. The following cases are described according to the division of the developed and the developing world.

In the developing world we witnessed the breakup of Indonesia, mainly in the region of Timor and New Guinea, an ongoing insurrection in the Philippines on the southern island of Mindao, and the royal house in Nepal lose its sovereignty in most parts of the state apart from the core.

The inhabitants of southern Sudan have been at war with northern core for 50 years, a conflict that has wrought economic, social and political disaster all across Sudan. In Egypt the grip of the Mubarak government, and before that the Sadat government, has become feeble on the periphery south of Asyut as far as Aswan, where the extremist Islamic movement has grown stronger.

In Turkey a Kurdish revolt is raging in the remote marches from around Dirbakir to the borders with Iraq and Iran. Today Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria feel threatened

by the Kurds who live in the far-off margins of these countries.

Responsibility for the recent revolution in Ethiopia, against the rule in Addis-Ababa, lies with a Tigre tribe from the northern periphery of the state, which endures heavy droughts and famine.

In Azerbaijan part of the periphery (Nagorno Karabakh) has been taken by Armenia, and the "fresh" core around Baku has not yet found a way of defending the periphery.

The history of the Sunnis in Syria is replete with fears of Syria being torn to pieces, first on account of the French and after independence on account of power struggles between Alawis and Druze, two fringe populations, against the Sunni majority in the core. In Lebanon the Shi'is bemoaned their deprivation on the geographical edge of the state, reacted with violence to change this situation, and in fact have taken control of the state of Lebanon.

China has acted with force in recent decades to prevent separatist processes or rebellion on the periphery by occupying Tibet and cruel suppression of the Muslim population in the west of the state.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fit the model of disintegration of the multi-national state, and indeed the rim exploited the weakness of the center, deserted the core, and set out on the path of independence.

The example of Ukraine in 2004 is interesting. The west of the state is a region remote from the center, the population is Catholic, the language is Ukrainian, and the population is rural for the most part. The core eastward of the capital Kiev is Christian Orthodox, the language is Russian, the population is mainly urban, and the land is rich in coal and industrialized. After the era of the "planned economy" the condition of the rural margin in western Ukraine declined, but the government ignored it and continued to invest in the core and to encourage the development of economic strength east of Kiev. In 2004 Kiev became a battleground between the presidential candidate supported by the periphery, Viktor Yushenko, and his rival from the core, Viktor Yanukovich. The struggle put the Ukrainian people on the brink of civil war, and the rift was so deep that the politicians and the media in the core of Ukraine spoke openly of the possibility that the Donetsk region, which lies in the east, would detach itself from the impoverished periphery and attach itself to 'Big Brother' Russia.

So much for the developing world. In the developed world the slow but persistent process continues of infiltration of Mexicans and Latin-Americans, Catholic in religion, into the southern fringe parts of the USA, with demographic, economic, and cultural changes greatly contrasting with what takes place in the "White" Protestant north.

In Europe, constant tension is evident between Corsica and the center in Paris, with hints of a desire by the island to break away from the French Republic. Spain has for years adopted a cautious policy for fear of deterioration in relations between Catalonia and center. In the north of Italy voices have been heard in support of separation from the impoverished south.

In Northern Ireland, for many long years a revolt has been going on against the central government in London for separation of the north from Britain and its attachment to Eire in the south. A similar case is Quebec province in Canada.

The narrative of complex relations between the center and the fringe, then, encompasses the world. It is characterized by cyclicity of attempts at separation, irredentism, and cries by the peripheral regions to the rich center not to ignore them. Israel faces similar center-margin problems, but its unique features demand of it special and enhanced sensitivity in view of the dangers that these problems create.

CHAPTER TWO

CONVERGENCE INTO GREATER TEL AVIV²

Since the rise of the state, Israel has followed a policy of population dispersal. This is expressed in the establishment of new settlements and shoring up of long-standing areas on the sparsely populated periphery, attraction of economic activity, mainly in industry, towards the margins, and investment in the transport and communications infrastructure so as to allow mutual accessibility of the center and the periphery. Yet despite the declared policy, and many years also of a practical policy of population dispersal, a process of concentration of population in the Tel Aviv metropolis continues at full steam (Gradus, 1990).

The Tel Aviv metropolis extends from Hadera in the north to Ashqelon in the south. The eastern boundary of the metropolis is problematic. On the one hand, many connections exist between Jerusalem - Israel's virtual capital - and the Tel Aviv metropolis. On the other hand, there is great competition between the two population centers, over resources and over their very status. The border between the two centers according to our perception is based on the main daily traffic on the Modi'in-Bet Shemesh axis (Map 1).

A similar problem exists in the attempt to determine the boundary between the area of influence of the Tel Aviv metropolis and the northern metropolis of Haifa. This city, like all the settlements of the coastal plain, is an integral part of the Tel Aviv space, but in several respects the northern metropolis tries, unsuccessfully, to retain its local identity (the "watershed" between greater Tel Aviv and Haifa passes through the Binyamina-Zichron Ya'akov region).

Beer Sheva is too weak to fashion any meaningful independence, but if, nevertheless, we seek a "watershed" between it and the Tel Aviv space we shall find it between Qiryat Gat and Lehavim Junction. Ashqelon and Sderot are more attached to Tel Aviv than to Beer Sheva.

The Tel Aviv space itself is composed of the central city of Tel Aviv- Jaffa. Around it are the other settlements of the Dan bloc that enclose it on all sides, and this is the first ring of greater Tel Aviv. Around the Dan bloc is located the central region, which forms the second ring; it includes the settlements Rishon Le-ziyon, Petah

2. The Tel Aviv space, Tel Aviv metropolis, the Israeli core, "Tel Aviv state".


Tiqwa, Kefar Sava, Ra'anana, Herzliya, and others. In 2006 this ring could be seen expanding towards Netanya, Hadera, the Route 4 settlements as far as Hadera, the "Kokhav" settlements in the east of the region as far as Modi'in and its suburbs, Rehovot, Gedera, and the surrounding settlements, and also toward Ashdod and Ashqelon including the entire Ashdod region (see Map 2).

The Tel Aviv metropolis concentrates national activity in capital-based areas (human and financial) such as business and financial services, and knowledge-based industries (high tech), and also acts as a focus of economic control and supervision on the national level. Located in it are the stock exchange, the head offices of many international companies and conglomerates, numerous cultural and educational institutions, and also some state institutions of Israel and the embassies of foreign states. The economic functions that presently exist, among others, in greater Tel Aviv allow Israel to operate on the required level to withstand international competition and to be part of the global economy.

Israel has succeeded in developing an economy that functions on the level of states of the developed world, despite the social, cultural, security, political, and geopolitical circumstances, whose like is unknown in any other Western state; it is a unique case in the world - an "island of Westernism" in the heart of the developing and hostile Middle East. Its population is highly variegated in national, religious, ethnic, and cultural composition. Each sector of the population displays different demographic, social, and economic characteristics. Therefore, Israel's relative success in maintaining its Western character so far is not taken for granted, and is not eternally assured. Already today the buds of processes are present in Israeli society that are liable to change this reality in the foreseeable future (see Table 1, Figure 1 and Maps 1 and 5).

The special geopolitical nature of Israel

Two peoples dwell on Israel's terrain: the Jewish people, who are the majority in the state, and the Arab people, a national minority in Israel but a majority across the full extent of the historic Land of Israel, and certainly across the Middle East as a whole. Israel is unique case of a stable ethnic democracy, one that is identified with one group in the population that it is meant to serve, so that the established Jewish ethnic dominance in Israel necessarily clashes with the principle of equal rights for all citizens. The state declares itself the homeland of the Jewish people; the predominant language is Hebrew; the institutions, the official festivals, the symbols and the national heroes are Jews; the Law of Return grants instant and



Map 2: Encroachment of Tel Aviv state (source: Processing of data of the Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS], 2005)

Table 1: Composition of population in the Land of Israel (in millions), 2005-2020

Population group	Year		2020	
	2005		2020	
	Millions	%	Millions	%
Citizens in Israel:				
Jews	5.237	76.2	6.300	71.1
Druze	0.112	1.6	0.160	1.8
Arabs	1.234	17.8	2.000	22.3
among whom: Christians	0.117		0.170	
Muslims	1.117		1.830	
among whom: Bedouins in the south	0.140		0.300	
Jerusalem	0.260		0.450	
Other regions of Israel	0.717		0.100	
Other citizens	0.286	4.2	0.400	4.8
among whom: non-Arab Christians	0.040			
religion not stated	0.246			
Total citizens of Israel	6.869	100	8.860	100
Arabs illegally resident in Israel*	0.250		0.300	
among whom: in Jerusalem	0.150			
among the Bedouins	0.040			
in the northern settlements	0.060			
Foreign workers	0.200		0.300	
Total population of non-citizens	0.450		0.600	
Total population residing in Israel	7.319		9.460	
Inhabitants of the Palestinian entity**	3.500		6.200	
among whom: in the Gaza Strip	1.300		2.600	
in Judea and Samaria	2.200		3.600	
Palestinians resident in Jordan	4.000		6.500	
Total Palestinian Arab population	8.000		13.000-14.000	

Source: CBS, 2005; Soffer and Shalev, 2004; Palestinian sources according to data of censuses of the Palestinian population; various Israeli sources.

* On the assumption that the fence will bring an end to the massive penetration into Israel. Some of those residing illegally will receive citizenship, so their number will remain as it is.

** On the assumption that the fence will be completed and there will no longer be talk of "the whole Land of Israel", it will be correct no longer to count the Arabs of the territories as part of the state of Israel. They will be part of any entity that might arise in the future.

unconditional citizenship to Jewish immigrants, but withholds the right of return from the Palestinian refugees; the preference for Jews is expressed in many and varied ways, and the concern of most of them is to maintain the situation in which the state defines itself as Jewish and Zionist. The Arabs of Israel, especially the Muslim population, recognize Israel as a state but reject its ethnic form, and even define themselves as non-Zionists and anti-Zionists. The Arabs of Israel who cast doubt on Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist entity are perceived as a hostile and subversive element (Smootha, 1993, 2005).


The distribution of the population in Israel is characterized, among other things, by the center of the country, particularly the area around Tel Aviv, being mostly inhabited by Jews, while the Arabs are concentrated on the state's borderlands: in the hill-country in the region of the connecting line with the neighbors to the east, the so-called "Little Triangle", in Galilee, and in the northern Negev. Another part of the Palestinian people encloses Israel to the east, so that the Jews are "imprisoned" by Palestinians from Upper Galilee in the north to the Gaza Strip in the southwest (see Map 3).

As if this threat were not enough, the spread of the Palestinian people does not end at the River Jordan, but continues across it into the Kingdom of Jordan. Accordingly, the convergence into Tel Aviv of the Jews of Israel - as against the entire Palestinian population (Map 4) - takes on catastrophic significance.


Because the location of the population in a space (at the center or on the periphery) is important regarding all economic and social opportunities for the individual, this carries marked implications for the widening of cultural, social, and economic gaps between the two peoples. These gaps were large to begin with, as the Jewish immigrants from Europe brought with them Western culture and technology, and in Palestine they developed an advanced economy in all life domains. The Arab populations in Palestine were mostly fellahs, with some trades and small industry. The gap grew larger after Israel's 1948 War of Independence, when Palestinian intellectuals left Palestine and only fellahs remained. From this starting point, the narrowing of the gap will obviously take years, if it is possible at all.

Quantitative dimensions of the convergence into Greater Tel Aviv

In the first years of its existence Israel adopted an aggressive policy of population dispersal, and in consequence, even if the results were not brilliant, the state's margins flourished slowly but surely. A study of the growth rate of the periphery



Map 3: Distribution of the Arab population in Palestine as against the Tel Aviv metropolis



Map 4: Distribution of the Palestinian people in Palestine (source: Soffer, 2004)

as against the core shows that in 1962 the periphery was inhabited by 37.1% of the total Jewish population, and this rate increased to 39% in 1983. This also holds if we calculate the total settlements of the periphery as against the total settlements of the Mediterranean coast: 21.8% of the Jews in 1962 as against 25.8% in 1983 (see Table 2).

The years of immigration from the former Soviet Union were an important event for Israel, and despite the fact that most of the immigrants were settled in the core, several settlement processes took place on the periphery. For example, in the north Upper Nazareth, Karmiel, and Haifa were strengthened, in the south Beer Sheva; a few immigrants even made their way to Jerusalem.

In the decade 1995-2004 the trend to dispersal of the Jewish population stopped. Table 2 does not reflect the actual situation in full, because the rate of Jews on the periphery remained stationary in that decade. Furthermore, a young population migrated from the periphery to the center and left behind only an older and weaker population, as well as the addition of children through higher natural increase than at the center. In absolute figures abandonment of the periphery is extremely significant for Israel (see Figure 2 and Map 5).

In 1990-2005 about 200,000 people moved away from Jerusalem, and about 100,000 moved in. About 55,000 of the people who left Jerusalem went to the

Table 2: Qualitative dimensions of clustering of the Jewish population into the space of Greater Tel Aviv

Location/ Year	1962	1972	1983	1995	2004
Core population (percent) (Tel Aviv and center regions, and Hadera and Ashqelon districts)	62.9	61.9	61.0	59.0	59.0
Peripheral population (percent) (all other parts of the state)	37.1	38.1	39.0	41.0	41.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Jews on the Mediterranean shoreline (core, Haifa district, and Akko and Nahariyya regions)	78.2	76.4	74.2	70.5	70.5
Jews of the margins of the Mediterranean shoreline (the rest of the state)	21.8	23.6	25.8	29.5	29.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Processing of CBS data, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various years




Figure 2: Dispersal of young population, age 25-34, in selected cities in Israel (source: Alfasi and Fenster, 2005. Processing of CBS data, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1996-2004)

core. This is a significant order of magnitude - as if Karmiel and Ma'alot had become totally deserted within 15 years! In the north, including Haifa, some 43,000 people, mostly young, left for the core. This is the figure for the entire population of Karmiel! In the southern region there was a positive migration of 36,000, mostly to Ashdod and Ashqelon, and to the Negev almost none. A positive migration was registered every year across the Green Line too (to Judea and Samaria) but in sum the population there became smaller, and in most cases it concerns the hinterland of the Tel Aviv core (Upper Modi'in and the Ariel area). In all, in the last 15 years the core region has absorbed about 100,000 Jews from the peripheral regions!

The central region is the only part of Israel, except for the terrain of Judea and Samaria, which shows a positive migration balance of the veteran Jewish population. That is, the central region is growing at the expense of the neighboring regions, while the Jewish population is migrating from everywhere in the country to its center (see Maps 1 and 5).

Strengthening of the population of minorities on the periphery

Most of the inhabitants of the central region, about 92%, are Jews; the rest, some 8%, are the Arab minority. The enormous growth in every district of the central

region has occurred mainly because of the internal migration of Jews to the center of the country, a rate which in 2003 reached 14%! Note that the balance of migration of the Arab population is negligible.

In consequence of the Jews abandoning the periphery, and of the high natural increase among the Arabs, the proportion of non-Jewish population there has increased. Hence the process of converging into greater Tel Aviv amounts to a national disaster, for the periphery is slipping away from Jewish sovereignty, as the data of Table 3 below attest.

From Table 3 a clear and penetrating picture emerges. The Jewish population is declining in the districts of Safed, Yizre'el (in the valleys and the hill country), Akko (the hill country and the Mediterranean shoreline), Haifa (where the proportion of Jews is falling significantly), Hadera and the Beer Sheva region, where the decrease in the proportion of Jews is especially worrying for all who are concerned for Jewish existence in the south. In Jerusalem the picture is chilling.

Table 3: Proportion of Jews in the districts of the periphery, 1990-2004, percentages

Region/ Year	¹ 2000	1995	1990	2004
Safed district	90.5	89.6	91.0	83.2
Kinneret district	68.9	73.0	73.0	69.9
Yizre'el district (the valleys)	89.0	88.9	89.6	84.2
Yizre'el district (Nazareth mountains)	28.3	28.6	26.0	24.0 (Jews) 27.0 (Jews and others)
Akko district (mountain strip)	25.2	23.4	20.0	22.6
Akko district (shoreline strip)	66.4	66.0	67.5	60.8
Haifa district	90.7	88.9	90.1	82.6 (Jews) 90.1 (Jews and others)
Hadera district (shoreline)	77.8	76.8	74.0	73.0
Hadera district (internal strip)	5.4	2.9	2.0	4.9
Beer Sheva district	76.7	76.0	78.0	77.9
Beer Sheva district	65.6	66.2	69.0	55.9 (Jews) 61.9 (Jews and others)
Jerusalem mountains	69.2	71.2	72.6	65.8

Source: Processing of CBS data, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various years.

1. Data for 1995-2000 refer to Jews and others. Data of 2004 refer only to Jews.

Insignificant rises have occurred in the proportion of Jews in the Kinneret district and in Beer Sheva. In both cases this has taken place only in the last four years.

The process is plain to see: The Jews are deserting the periphery en route to the center, and the open spaces of this periphery are being seized at an accelerated and inexorable pace by Muslims.

In the Galilee mountains, in the part which overlaps the area determined as Palestinian in the partition plan of November 1947, the proportion of Jews in 2005 did not exceed 22-24%. In the Wadi Ara (Mount Alexander) region the proportion of Jews is only 4.9%! In the Beer Sheva region the Jews are sinking to a tie with the Bedouins: in 1990 their proportion was still 69%; today it is just 55.9%. In Jerusalem the situation is similar.

The central district (apart from the settlements of Judea and Samaria) is the only region in Israel (except Judea, Samaria and Gaza areas) that has grown through all the years. In 2004 the internal migration balance in central district was positive with the rate of 7.9 (per 1,000 people) migrating to it while Tel-Aviv-Jaffa alone had 11.9 migration rate. All the other districts have been suffering from a negative migration balance. In Jerusalem in 2004 migration rate comprised -9.5 (per 1,000 people), in Haifa -8.1 and Beer Sheva -10.9 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Convergence into greater Tel Aviv has become a one-way process, possibly irreversible, and whoever is to blame for the loss of the Jewish periphery bears personal, public, and national responsibility. This applies to political leaders, planners, capitalists, Treasury officials, the media, and the heads of the cities in the core. Academia for its part betrays its national missions again and again.

The strength of Tel Aviv compared with the periphery: economic, social, communications, military, and other

As we have seen, the phenomenon of kernel-margin in Israel has a **national and territorial-spatial nature**. When these are augmented by the **socio-economic** aspect the implications of this phenomenon for all areas of life are weighty. The center carries power in the financial domain in the branches of employment, education, communication, and culture, but also in many other fields that characterize the developed world. The periphery, by contrast, is weak economically and socially, is supported, and has the nature of the developing world, especially in the demographic and employment parameters. The enormous gaps between the center and the periphery have existed for years, but only recently have they relentlessly expanded.

Likewise the distribution of state resources is not evenhanded. The center is crowded, intensive activity takes place in it, and because the area is awash with problems, their treatment is continuous and ongoing. Acute problems are dealt with quickly to prevent delays which cause huge losses to the economy as a whole. On the periphery, by contrast, there are no "burning problems". Every matter is handled tardily and inadequately, because most resources, which are in any case limited, are directed to the center. Our argument is that the problems that mount up on the periphery are liable in the end to cause the economy losses no less than the burning problems in the center. Existential threats due to neglect of the periphery are beyond argument.

For years the perception prevailed that what is good for Tel Aviv is good for Israel. This notion was based on the theory (perhaps dubious from the start) that the central city would steadily encroach over the periphery. The expectation was that the population from the center would slip across into the rings adjacent to the core, hence also centers of commerce, business, and industry; then the spillover would expand to the still farther periphery. In Israeli terms Tel Aviv has indeed spread out - into the spaces of the Dan bloc. Today we witness the encroachment of national forces from the Dan bloc along Route 2, and also Route 4, northward, to Herzliya, the Shefayim area, Netanya, and Caesarea; eastward, to the Modi'in region, Rosh Ha'ayin (the "Kokhav" axis) and even to Jerusalem, the industrial area on Mount Hotsavim, and more; southward - to Rishon Lezion, Nes Ziona, Rehovot, Bilu Junction, and south to Ashdod, Ashqelon, and Qiryat Gat. In the future there will be a spread to Yoqne'am and perhaps to Afula.

In theory this notion works, but in practice it does not, because the spread of the center to the margins is advancing very slowly while Arab strengthening on the periphery is occurring apace: irreversible facts are being created that bode catastrophe for Jewish Israel. The problematic periphery of Jewish Israel lies in east Jerusalem, and the picture is unnerving. In the Galilee mountains, the valleys, as far as Qiryat Shemona, and also in Haifa, in Akko, and in Nahariyya, the departure of the youth for Tel Aviv is conspicuous. Throughout the hilly Galilee region, and also in the northern Negev, there are no signs of growth similar to those in the center. On the contrary, the socio-economic picture there is grim, and by the time the "healthy" spillover reaches the remote marches, no Jews will be left there and the collapse in every sphere and concern will be advancing fast, as is seen in this chapter.

We reiterate this important conclusion: before us is a race against time: what will win the race for the periphery - the Tel Aviv spillover (with the culture of globalization

and privatization of everything) or the seizure of the space by "others." For the time being the "others" seem to be ahead (see Maps 3 and 4 and tables below).

The socio-national strength of the center

The geographical location of every settlement in Israel, that is, its very belonging to the center or to the periphery, influences many areas of life in it, and in any event the lives of its residents. Thus we find differences in socio-economic status, in the quality of schooling and higher education, and in the unemployment level, and therefore also in chances and opportunities for the future. Education and income components are major characteristics of the gaps between the center and the periphery (Portnov & Er'el, 2003).

From publications of the Central Bureau of Statistics arising from the 1995 population and housing census regarding the total number of Jewish settlements in Israel with more than 10,000 residents, striking differences emerge in all socio-economic variables between the settlements of the center and of the periphery (see Map 6). According to these data, the condition of the peripheral settlements was worse than that of the center settlements in variables that were measured. Table 4 shows differences between the Jewish settlements in the **center** of the country and on the **periphery**, in the socio-economic domain.

The settlements of the center numbering more than 10,000 Jewish inhabitants account for a population of some three million, and in the peripheral settlements numbering more than 10,000 Jewish settlements live a total of some 1.7 million people. That is, the research population includes most of the Jewish citizens of Israel, who, from the location of their residence alone, in terms of living standard belong variously to the developed world and to the developing world. From Table 4 it transpires that gaps exist to the benefit of the center in belonging to a given socio-economic cluster, and in several other socio-economic variables.

Belonging to a given socio-economic cluster reflects the socio-economic level of the population in a settlement. This measure was calculated by the Central Bureau of Statistics on the basis of variables such as demography (dependency rate, median age, percentage of families with four or more children), schooling and higher education, occupation, unemployment and pension, living standard (passenger cars per 1,000 people, percentage of new cars, average income per capita) and socio-economic distress. Ten levels of socio-economic cluster are isolated, in ascending order. From the table it appears that mean membership of the center

Table 4: Differences in socio-cultural dimensions between settlements of the center and of the periphery (Jewish settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants)

Socio-economic variables	Settlements of the center (average of 32 Settlements: Even Yehuda, Bet Shemesh, Bene Beraq, Bat Yam, Giv'at Shemuel, Giv'atayim, Gedera, Gan Yavne, Ganne Tiqwa, Hod HaSharon, Herzliya, Holon, Yavne, Yehud, Jerusalem, Kefar Yona, Kefar Sava, Mevasseret Ziyon, Modi'in, Maccabim-Re'ut, Nes Ziyvona, Netanya, Petah Tiqwa, Qiryat Ono, Rosh HaAyin, Rishon LeZion, Rehovot, Ramat Gan, Ramat HaSharon, Ra'annana, Shoham, Tel Aviv-Jaffa)	Settlements of the periphery (average of 32 Settlements: Ofaqim, Or Aqiva, Eilat, Ashdod, Ashqelon, Beer Sheva, Bet She'an, Dimona, Zikhron Ya'aqov, Hadera, Haifa, Tiberias, Tirat Karmel, Yoqne'am Illit, Karmiel, Migdal HaEmeq, Nahariyya, Nazerat Illit, Neshet, Netivot, Akko, Afula, Arad, Pardes Hanna-Karkur, Safed, Qiryat Atta, Qiryat Bialik, Qiryat Gat, Qiryat Tiv'on, Qiryat Yam, Qiryat Motzkin, Qiryat Mal'akhi, Qiryat Shemona, Sderot)	Level of statistical significance
Socio-economic cluster	7	5	p<0.001
Mean income per capita (NIS monthly)	3,877	2,936	p<0.001
Percent students among the 20-29 age group	18.7	12.9	p<0.01
Percent eligible for matriculation among the 17-18 age group	52.5	45.8	p<0.013

Source: Processing of CBS data for 2001

settlements is to cluster 7, while the settlements of the periphery belong on average to cluster 5. In mean gross monthly income there is a difference of about NIS 1,000 to the benefit of the center. In terms of schooling and higher education, achievements in the center are higher.

Sure enough, a simple comparative analysis shows the existence of wide gaps between center and periphery in Israel as a function of place of residence only, even without any attempt to locate and investigate the reasons and causes of these gaps. At issue, then, is the impending catastrophe in the link between the ability of citizens of the state to advance, to acquire a decent higher education, and to possess means, and the place of their residence. Clearly, if such a link exists,

anyone with eyes in his head will try to improve his own and his children's chances of succeeding in life by moving to a place where the chances of success are greater.

In fact, this process has been going on for years: populations have been deserting their residences on the periphery, that is, run-down places, and establishing their homes in the more developed center of the country. These are mostly young people, in search of their way and finding it in the center, and young families looking for sources of employment suited to their talents, high living standards, and a high educational standard for their children.

Note that populations are to be found that from the outset did not choose to live on the periphery. This refers to the immigrants of the 1990s from the former Soviet Union. About one million immigrants arrived in Israel, and their place of residence was determined as the big cities, mainly according to available sources of employment for the family heads and according to the level of services there to meet the needs of the many elderly people who were among these immigrants.

We shall now attempt to pinpoint the reasons and possible causes for the existence of the gaps. A low employment rate has a negative effect on living standards and on the volume of production, and enlarges the dimensions of poverty and inequality. Flug and Kasir-Kaliner (2001) found that lack of employment is the major factor affecting the likelihood of being poor in Israel. In families without breadwinners the chances of their being below the poverty line are four times greater than in families in which the household head works. A long stay outside the labor market also is liable to bring about a loss of part of the work skills of the unemployed and to impede their return to employment in the future. A low rate of participation in work also causes mass government intervention, through transfer payments as treatment for poverty and inequality in the distribution of incomes, and this increases the burden on the public purse.

The periphery suffers most from low participation in the workforce (see Table 5). By contrast, the rate of workers in the center of the country approaches the average of the OECD states, but does not quite reach it. Clearly, in regions where there is less work, incomes are lower. Figure 3 shows the wage gaps between selected settlements in the center and two large settlements on the periphery: Beer Sheva and Jerusalem.

The result is evident, and indeed well known: Jews from the periphery try to move to the center in order to close off the economic, social, and other glaring gaps between themselves and the residents in the center.

Table 5: Rate of employees in the civilian work force in selected settlements in 2004 and the OECD average.

Region, district of residence and settlements with more than 100,000 residents	Rate of employees in the civilian workforce aged 15 years and older	Rates of unemployed aged 15 years and older
Jerusalem Region	45.7	7.7
Jerusalem	44.5	7.0
North Region	50.1	12.5
Safed district	61.2	13.5
Kinneret district	54.8	13.6
Yizre'el district	49.5	10.9
Akko district	47.8	13.8
Haifa Region	53.0	11.0
Haifa	54.5	10.2
Center Region	60.9	9.9
Netanya	54.7	11.2
Petah Tiqwa	61.0	10.4
Rishon LeZion	61.3	10.8
Rehovot	64.5	10.5
Tel Aviv Region	58.2	8.8
Tel Aviv	62.5	9.3
Ramat Gan	58.6	5.7
Bene Beraq	37.3	12.1
Bat Yam	54.0	10.2
Holon	59.5	10.0
South Region	54.0	12.9
Ashdod	53.7	9.7
Ashqelon	55.6	17.8
Beer Sheva	54.9	15.0
National mean	54.9	10.4
OECD mean (2003)	69.8	6.9

Sources: Processing of CBS data, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2005*; *OECD Employment Outlook, 2004*.




Figure 3: Wage disparities in selected settlements in 2001. Source: Alfasi and Fenster, 2005. Processing of National Insurance Institute data.

A comparison may be drawn between every settlement in greater Tel Aviv and every settlement on the Israeli periphery, showing the unacceptable differences between the two areas. We illustrate this only with a comparison between Tel Aviv municipality and Jerusalem municipality (for those who might have forgotten, the capital of Israel, "City of Zion", "the Eternal City" "Jerusalem the Golden", Jerusalem "built as a city that is compact together" ,Psalms 122:3!) See Table 6.

The gaping differences leap off the page, no matter who is to blame. The fact is that there is nothing for a Jew to look for in Jerusalem, and he moves west. In Alfasi and Fenster's (2005) article we find the following remarks: "The glaring

Table 6: Comparative data from the municipal budgets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1999

Budget item / Place	Jerusalem	Tel Aviv
Average municipal per capita expenditure, from current budget, NIS	3,084	7,326
Average municipal per capita expenditure, from special (development) budget, NIS	822	1,403
Percentage income from housing rates out of income for taxes	61%	24%
Percentage self-income out of total regular budget	61.2%	84.8%
Total per capita income in municipality's regular budget, NIS (1997)	2,581	6,078
Total per capita expenditure in municipality's regular budget, NIS (1997)	2,733	7,160

Source: Alfasi and Fenster, 2005. Data of Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality, 1999; Jerusalem municipality, 2001.

datum in the comparison between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv is the limited budgetary volume in which Jerusalem works, as against the budgetary volume in Tel Aviv. Despite the size of the Jerusalem population (almost double that of Tel Aviv) and the fact of its being the capital city and the location of the elected parliament and the government institutions, its budget amounts to 77.9% of that of Tel Aviv. Thus, in Jerusalem the municipality spends less on municipal services (health, security, town planning, town inspection, and so on) and less on development” (p. 277). That is, whoever is strong can simply disregard proper procedures. These authors continue: “Despite the deficit Tel Aviv continues to retain its independence against the state institutions, largely thanks to its self-generating budgetary base, the electoral strength of its inhabitants, and the mutual understanding that Tel Aviv municipality is a powerful political body that cannot easily be bent to the will of government ministries” (p. 279).

Below are more tables showing the power of Tel Aviv in every economic area and issue, **and the conclusions recur again and again: Tel Aviv is drying up the Jewish periphery of Israel to the point of an existential threat to the state!**

The economic power of the Tel Aviv metropolis

Most of the Israeli powerful live in Tel Aviv metropolis and the settlements in the center; in any event, they are the trend-setters (Kipnis, 2005). In other words, the capitalism of Israel, together with its bureaucratic and political attachés, the consumer and media elites - all are concentrated in the Tel Aviv metropolis. These operate the multi-national firms, they have offices worldwide and in the Tel Aviv metropolis, with the aim of ensuring the companies' effective functioning in the

global economy. Most of the companies active in the international economy are centered in this metropolis, and around them a busy commercial services sector is located, that is, companies in the banking, accounting, commercial law, advertising, and marketing branches. For example, in Tel Aviv are **all** the headquarters of the large banking institutions, about 86% of the headquarters of the smaller banking institutions, **all** the headquarters of the mutual funds, and most stockbrokers, non-bank financiers, business consultants, and insurance companies (see Table 7). About 95% of all high-tech firms are there too, including about 86% of communications companies, about 90% of firms in the information technologies and Internet branch, about 60% of electronics and hardware firms, and about 80% of the firms in the software branch (see Table 8). The following tables, all in the economics domain, substantiate this strength.




Figure 4: Main place of activity of wielders of influence in the Israeli economy (source: Kipnis, 2005)

Table 7: Financial and business services in Tel Aviv-Jaffa and in Israel in 2001

Financial/business service	Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Israel
Trust funds' headquarters	100%	0
Major banks' headquarters	100%	0
Small banks' headquarters	90%	10%
Non-banking financial institutions' headquarters	53% (60% including Ramat Gan)	47%
Stockbrokers	59% (70% including Ramat Gan)	41%
Non-bank credit brokerage	38% (45% including Ramat Gan)	62%
Insurance consultants' and agents' offices	29% (40% including Ramat Gan)	71%
Law firms	39% (47% including Ramat Gan)	61%

Source: Tel Aviv municipality, 2001

Table 8: Location of centers of global economic activity in Israel in 2004 (in percent)

Branch / Location of head offices	Tel Aviv city	Tel Aviv metropolis	Other parts of Israel
High tech industries	16	79	5
Communications	18	68	14
Information technologies	19	72	9
Internet	20	71	9
Electronics industry	58		42
Software industry	80		20
Lawyers serving the global economy	69	15	16
Advertising firms serving global economy	86	14	0
Economic and other quality services	85		15

Source: Kipnis 2005

Cultural power

Concentrations of population, capital, and economic activity in the Tel Aviv metropolis create great demand for cultural and artistic activity. The Tel Aviv metropolis is Israel's cultural center, the focus of social activity and the center of the leisure culture. In it are most of the cultural institutions of the state: theaters, an opera house, large symphony orchestras, concert halls, grand museums, and so on. Most of the members of the creative class (Alfasi and Fenster, in press) are concentrated in it, about 60% of academics and scientists, about 90% of theater artistes - actors, singers, dancers, and their accompanists, about 76% of artists belonging to societies of painters and sculptors, and about 54% of architectural firms (Kipnis, 2005) (see Table 9). The city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa itself embraces some 75% of all performance-goers (see Tables 10-11). Why should a Jew to go looking around the national periphery with figures like these?

Table 9: Geographic distribution of members of the creative class (in percent)

Population	N	Tel Aviv city	Rest of the metropolis	Rest of Israel
Academics and scientists	309,000	28	29	43
Stage performers: actors, singers, dancers, all who accompany them	1,205	89		11
Painters and sculptors (members of a society)	4,200	76		24
Architects' offices	1,158	33	21	46
Physicians (the best in Israel)	379	28	52	20

Source: Kipnis, 2005

Table 10: Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a national center for cultural activity

Cultural element	Tel Aviv-Yafo	Israel	Total
Large theaters	5	4	9
Performances	55%	45%	100%
Audiences at performances	73% of all audiences attending performances in the city	27%	100%
Opera House	1	0	1
Large symphony orchestras	1 (the largest - the Israel Philharmonic)	3	4

Source: Tel Aviv municipality, 2002

Table 11: Visitors to cultural performances in 1999

Performance type	Jerusalem	Tel Aviv
Theater	251,620	1,296,125
Music	133,182	531,296
Dance	33,234	136,333
Total	418,036	1,963,754

Source: Alfasi and Fenster, 2005, data of *Jerusalem Municipality Statistical Yearbook 2001*

The residents of greater Tel Aviv of the middle and upper classes enjoy rich, enthralling cosmopolitan culture, and in this atmosphere of economic wealth and high-living is created a feeling of "all's well" - and also blindness to events of the periphery and processes leading to devastation.

The disparities between greater Tel Aviv and the national peripheral regions can be demonstrated in almost every sphere, even in expenditure by the Israel National Roads Company on paving roads. In certain years about 60% of total expenditure here was in the greater Tel Aviv areas. Likewise regarding building starts there in various years by the ministry of housing, which accounted for 70-85% of the total tenders issued, as if the periphery did not exist at all. It applies to investments per student in terms of lecturer units, to level of teachers, to complementary

schooling, sports facilities, and nurturing of schoolchildren, and in an extreme form to area of entertainment and leisure. The closer we examine and bring in new data, the more we will be obliged to reach the inevitable conclusion that anyone who wishes to improve his or her quality of life and to provide his or her children with good education has nothing to look for on the periphery - the quiet, the beauty, the absence of traffic snarl-ups, and a better climate than the Tel Aviv summer notwithstanding. Few people in the world regard advantages of this kind as an alternative to the fine points of the big city.

If we select at random any academic field in Israel we shall see clearly how the peripheral institutions in it are growing steadily weaker against the strengthening of Tel Aviv. In Figure 5 we give data of the areas of design, and the picture is hard to take! It transpires that a respected institution like Bezalel cannot contend with the advantages of parallel institutions in the center, and it is gradually declining in terms of the number of its students. Does a situation like this exist in Britain, for example? There, despite the strength of London, we find on the periphery Cambridge, and dozens of other glorious institutions; this shows that something amiss is happening here in Israel, and a rapid and fundamental change is essential.

We may summarize this section with a passage from Alfasi and Fenster (in press): “The spatial distribution of the creative class has far-reaching economic and social significance. In the last decade the gaps between the average wage in Israel and the wage in the high tech fields have constantly widened. In parallel, expenses on luxury goods have increased, which has greatly enlarged the incomes of those engaged in other areas of creativity, including the design and architectural professions. The spaces of high tech and concentrations of the creative class have become central for active centers of consumption and are well served, and the disparities between them and the urban concentrations in the north and south have expanded. The picture is clear: as exposure to globalization increases, as investments and production in the fields of information technologies grow, so does hardship increase and so do the social and economic gaps in Israel widen. When poverty is the heritage of the periphery (although it is present in the center of the country too), plenty and available income are a characteristic feature of the center of the country, closely coinciding with concentrations of commercial creativity”.

Everything that we have said about economic, social, and cultural power applies to educational, entertainment, and culinary power too.




Figure 5: Students at institutions of higher learning (first and second degrees) in the field of design (Source: Alfasi and Fenster, 2005; CBS data)

Bezalel: Industrial design, graphic design, ceramic design, and environmental design for the first degree; industrial and artistic design for the second degree. Jerusalem

Shenker College: Graphic and industrial design, fashion design, textile design and jewelry design, first degree only. Ramat Gan

Technological Academic Institute: Industrial design, first degree only. Holon

Academic track of the College of Management: Interior design, first degree only. Tel Aviv

Media power of Tel Aviv

It is no secret that most of the Israeli media are located in the center of Tel Aviv, or at least the leading spokespersons are there. This holds for the television channels, radio, the daily press (*Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv*, *Yediot Aharonot*, *Globes*), the spokespersons of the different ministries, and academics who specialize in communication. The work teams of all this system, as Tel Avivians (throughout the Dan bloc), live among Jews and lead rich cosmopolitan urban lives, as we described above. The great Jewish city fills them with enormous confidence. Most of them have never visited any place between Kefar Sava and Qalqiliya, and if they have, it is doubtful that they understood what was going on around them, because their attention was fixed on the nearby winery, the cheese hut, or a quaint restaurant.

In this urban space they build their dovish world view, "moral", peace-loving, "intellectual", cosmopolitan. But they have no connection with Israeli reality as we have described it so far. This army of journalists, some of them professional and talented, some ignorant and dull, are they who define the national agenda. This is a press that deals with Tel Aviv's pavements and with cats, with refurbishing the cultured concert hall of the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra, and entirely ignore what is taking place in Tiberias, Afula, Akko, Netivot, Ofaqim, and all other Jewish peripheral townships. (Only this year, 2006, one of the Tel Aviv newspapers sent a (woman) reporter to stay a few days in Yeruham!).

The journalists of Tel Aviv refuse to cover events, as important as they may be, in Beer Sheva, Haifa, or Jerusalem. Their annual celebration is expressed in the Herzliya Conference (see Appendix 1). And when there is no report on the periphery it does not exist, and when everything turns around Tel Aviv, a twisted world perception of Israel and of the threats to its existence materializes. While Israel is shrinking into the Dan bloc, the media are busy with gossip-mongering, puzzles, and parades of dancers.

If in the future the Jewish people were to appoint a commission of inquiry to clarify the reasons for the collapse of Israel, the media would occupy a place of honor among the accused (see Appendix 2).

Military strength

The Tel Aviv metropolis is a focus of military strength in Israel. In this area lie the IDF general staff and the ministry of defense (not in Jerusalem), the intelligence, the national defense college, the IDF staff and command college; the military media - Army Radio, the IDF journal *Bamahaneh*, and the IDF spokesperson's office; military installations at Sarafand, Tel Hashomer, and Ramat Gan; training bases, logistics bases, Dov airport, navy facilities south of Herzliya and at Rishpon, officers' residences at Ramat Hasharon, Yavneh, Rosh Ha'ayin, Maccabim-Reut, Modi'in - the list goes on.

From the security and strategic aspect, the concentration of military targets in the heart of the state is a dangerous situation, and certainly not essential. The location of defensive, economic, cultural, communication, and other centers in one place is unthinkable in state such as Israel. The centrality of Tel Aviv is so overwhelming that in one fell swoop it would be possible to neutralize almost all powers operating in the state, except for the political power which mainly is concentrated in Jerusalem;

those powers have no replacement, which cannot be said about other power centers. Naturally, any element that in the future wishes to overcome Israel will aim to strike Tel Aviv, and the dire significance of such an assault for Israel cannot be overstated.

The role of the planning system in the convergence into greater Tel Aviv

The planning administration of the ministry of the interior, which in coordination with other relevant ministries is supposed to initiate, plan, and carry out national projects in the areas of industry, transport, preservation of green assets, and population distribution (as they tried to do in the first years of the state's establishment) has in the last two decades been content with an attempt to preserve the status quo, and again and again has succumbed to short-sighted real-estate forces. In the 1990s Israel had a golden opportunity to disperse throughout the country about 800,000 Jews, most of whom had arrived from the former Soviet Union. But instead of transforming the map of population dispersal, a national master-plan (NMP 31) was drawn up, followed by another (NMP 35), both of which focus mainly on greater Tel Aviv. These plans betrayed Zionism for the immediate gratification of absorbing the new immigrants in places high in demand.

These catastrophe-laden plans, plastered over with rhetorical claptrap, are what brought about the dismal population distribution of Israel as it appears in 2006. If the main national effort was invested in the spaces of greater Tel Aviv, no wonder that the Jewish periphery, weak in any case, has collapsed entirely. One of the mind-boggling justifications voiced in the course of the 1990s was that Israel was moving toward "an environment of peace" with all its neighbors, so there was no need for a national periphery; indeed, we were similar to France, and there was no fear for Galilee or the Negev, and so forth.

The brilliant planners who unfolded their awesome projects to 2020 spoke in two tongues, depending on where they appeared. In the public ear they talked of population dispersal and concern for the periphery; behind the scenes they were at pains to populate land evacuated of national infrastructures in Ramat Hasharon, Pi Haglilot Junction, and Tel Hashomer, and the practical array of the plans reached as far as Qiryat Gat in the south and Yoqne'am in the north.

An example of this suicidal policy is the decision to establish the town of Modi'in. This made it possible for hundreds of thousands of people to find housing close

to Tel Aviv, and at the expense of the veteran rim, and at the same time created marvelous conditions for many citizens of Jerusalem to migrate (escape) to the center, while one member of the couple worked in Tel Aviv and the other continued to work in Jerusalem. This terrible experience has recently been copied in the north, where a number of architects are trying with all their might and main, imagination, and manipulations to create the "City of the Bay", apparently in the wish that the surfers of Haifa and Nahariyya will move there (and not to Galilee) and that the inhabitants of Karmiel, Upper Nazareth, and Ma'alot will likewise abandon their settlements for the benefit of this new town on the coastal plain near Haifa.

Here is what Kipnis (2005), he too a planner, writes: "The settlement dispersal in Israel is of 'a huge head without a body'. This circumstance has been created following a continuous process of withdrawal from the policy of population dispersal, and even from the liberal approach of this policy that was adopted by the NMP 31 team in the early 1990s, and consequently by the master plan for Israel 2020, by the documents of the policy for the metropolises of Tel Aviv and Haifa" (p. 281).

The Arabs of Palestine: A catalyst of the convergence into Tel Aviv

In the phenomenon of Jewish convergence into the Tel Aviv space an indirect part is played by Arabs of Israel also. Because the peripheral areas have large concentrations of Arabs, the living standard is low, the Jews feel threatened (psychologically or actually) for many reasons, so the Jewish population living in them prefers to migrate to the center.

In 2005 the Arabs of Israel (including those of Jerusalem) numbered about 1.5 million, constituting about 20% of the total population of Israel. Natural increase of this population, which is among the highest in the world, fluctuated around 3.1% annually in 2005 (in the Muslim population). Natural increase of the Bedouin living in the south of Israel is even higher - 5.5% annually, due to the growing number of women, many of whom come to Israel from outside (Hebron, the Gaza Strip, and southern Jordan). It is forecast that in 2020 the Arab population in Israel will reach two million and more. Even if we subtract from this number the data for Druze, Christians, Arabs of Jerusalem, and Bedouins, the figure for the Muslim population, in 2005 data, is still 870,000, which is likely to reaching two million in 2025. This rapid increase has implications on three distinct levels: family, municipal, and national.

On the **family level** the significance of the high natural increase is many children and few breadwinners. This forecast promises the continuation of poverty in the Arab sector (despite the fall in natural increase in the last decade: demographic momentum will work its own influence).

On the **municipal level**, the inhabitants' low official income yields lower tax revenues for the local and government authorities. In the Arab settlements a complex and problematic situation has arisen: population growth on the one hand and a dwelling culture of a house in its own land on the other. These factors contribute to the extensive spread of Arab settlement with single-story houses. To this are added state failures, namely non-enforcement of the law and lack of a match between the master plan and the situation on the ground. Because of the poverty there is no accord between the expansion of the boundaries of the settlement and the revenues of the municipal authority. The single-story houses that are multiplying in the Arab villages sometimes remain without a decent infrastructure of roads and sidewalks, water supply, sewage, electricity, or telephone systems, or schools and other services. A byproduct of this development is a picture of neglect in the settlements of the Arab sector, enormous claims for government assistance, resentment against the authorities, and a feeling of deep deprivation, accompanied by violence and crime that far outstrip the national average. The combination of demographic data and the reality on the ground does not augur well. The municipal chaos in the Arab sector may well be irreversible.

On the **national level** the demographic increase causes changes in power relations between the Muslims, whose natural increase rate is high (especially among the Bedouin) and the Christians and Druze, who are relatively few in number. Certain settlements which in the past were Christian, such as Kafr Kana and Nazareth, have become mostly Muslim. In other settlements, such as Ibn Snan, the proportion of Muslims is steadily rising. In the mixed towns too, such as Akko, Ramla, Lod, and even Haifa, changes are taking place in these relative strengths (CBS data, 2005). Demographic increase also produces a feeling of independence and strength, and impedes the enforcement of various laws in the Arab concentrations. The combination of a sense of power and feelings of frustration, whose basis is personal, religious, economic, and national, is fertile soil for the formation of extremist movements. This situation stimulates and encourages educational, religious, legal, social, and political separatist processes, as well as nationalist expressions, some of them very severe, such as the insurrection or quasi-insurrection that took place at the start of the events of the al-Aqsa intifada (September-October 2000). One

expression of these conditions is an appeal to external bodies and receipt of international support on the grounds of municipal deprivation. As we have seen, the municipal situation embodies a combination of real deprivation with high natural increase, and a culture of single-story building spread over large expanses.

High natural increase, as it exists in the Arab sector in Israel, is also found in the areas of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, and presumably the population in these territories will make mighty efforts to enter the richer and safer Israel (even assuming no national-religious motivation). These pressures have borne fruit in the past, and in 1967-2006 more than 300,000 Palestinians entered Israel by all possible means.

The dissatisfaction of the Arabs of Israel, and their political and religious desires, find expression in various demands: to eliminate the Jewish-Zionist state and turn it into "a state for all its citizens"; to return to their deserted villages, or at least to rebuild the mosques and resume burial in them; and autonomy in the fields of education, culture, communications, and local government.

In September and October 2000 relations between Jews and Arabs took a major turn for the worse. Leaders of the Arab sector in Israel urged law-breaking, violence against the police, and removal and elimination from their settlements of symbols of Israeli sovereignty such as police stations and the national flag, and even bank branches. Such symbols and institutions were set on fire in many of the settlements of the Triangle, the Negev, and Galilee. Arab violence included blocking major highways, gunfire, and the imposition of a prolonged siege on (Jewish) Upper Nazareth and the Misgav region. Among the demonstrators slogans were shouted such as "Slaughter the Jews!" and "With blood and fire we shall redeem Palestine". Similar behavior had taken place in the past, on Land Day in March 1976, in the Lebanon war of 1982, and in the Um al-Fahm riots in 1998, but never of such scope and force.

From 2000 to the end of 2005 the number of acts of sabotage in which Arab citizens of Israel participated rose. Summing up the set of data and processes, we see that the outlook is not bright. There is thus an urgent need to populate and strengthen Jewish settlements on the periphery, and in parallel to attend to the needs of the Arab sector in a practical manner.

The Arab people on either side of the border are united by ties of marriage, culture, the economy (official and "black"), religion and nation, and also of geography.

The settlements of the "Little Triangle" (e.g., Um al-Fahm, Barta'a, Taybeh, Kafr Qasem, and Kafr Bara) and Arab settlements in the south (e.g., Hawra and Kusafiyya) are on the Green Line and are joined in a geographic continuum with their brothers across the border. For years Jenin served as a second "capital", economically, for the Arabs of the north of Israel, until the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada (September 2000), and Ramallah was the cultural "capital" for large parts of Israeli Arab society.

To conclude, already today there is in Israel a large Arab population, with a developed national consciousness, which sees itself as an inseparable part of the Palestinian people whose center is in the West Bank. It is highly likely that in the two parts of the Palestinian people sufficiently large forces will exist to approximate them, so that in due course they will act as one for the establishment of a large Palestinian state - from the sea to the desert. The fact that in 2005 voices were heard from the Israeli-Arab side refusing to discuss these ties, or the possibility of their national union with the Arabs of the territories, must not be allowed to confuse the Jews of Israel. First, today the economic disparity between the Arabs of Israel and its neighbors is among the greatest in the world, and no one in his right mind will want to experience a fall in his living standard. Second, no Palestinian Arab will make things easier for Israel by making it still more Jewish and Zionist, and every such person will do everything to undermine the Jewish majority in the first stage, so as to turn it into a bi-national state in the second stage and into a Palestinian state, from the sea to the desert, in the third, Final, stage.

In 2005 this terrain contained a Palestinian population of eight million, and in 2020 it will number some 13 million. In such a setting increasing national tensions are likely within Israel, and also increasing difficulties between Israel and the Palestinians throughout the Land of Israel and Jordan (see Maps 1 and 3). A Jewish society of six million on the shoreline, of whom four-five million are in the Tel Aviv metropolis, will be hard pressed, fifteen years from now, to contend with a minority of about two million Palestinians within the state, alongside six million Palestinians living in the other parts of the western Land of Israel, and about four and a half million across the River Jordan, all of whom will have territorial contiguity with the Tel Aviv metropolis (see Map 4).

Next we shall illustrate the dimensions of the poverty on the periphery, with a comparison of the Jewish and Arab sectors.

Socio-economic gaps between Jewish and Arab settlements of the periphery

The demographic structure of the different sectors in Israel (Jewish and Arab) involves more poverty, lower rate of people in work (especially women), and lower level of investment in education in the Arab than in the Jewish population (Sadan, 2005; Flug and Kasir, 2001). A set of indices of living standard attests to socio-economic weakness among the Arabs in Israel generally. The population of disaffected poor is particularly the Muslim one (Gronau, 2002). Because the Arabs of Israel live on the periphery there is no chance that in the foreseeable future an improvement in their economic and social condition will occur.

Table 12 concerns the differences between the Jewish and the Arab settlements on the periphery. In the Jewish peripheral settlements of more than 10,000 residents dwell about 1.7 million people, and in the Arab settlements of more than 10,000 residents live about half a million people.

A comparison of the socio-economic variables among Jews and Arabs in Israel shows clear differences in all of them ($p < 0.001$). Jewish settlements belong on average to socio-economic cluster 5 out of 10, and Arab settlements to cluster 2. In average monthly gross income there is a difference of about NIS 1,500 in favor of the Jews, and also large gaps in schooling, higher education, and demographic variables.

Studies show lower workforce participation among the Arabs than the Jews, especially among the women. In the last decade the rate of male Arab workforce participation dropped faster than that of Jewish males, while the rise in rate of female Arab workforce participation was slower than that of Jewish females. These findings reflect the declining status of Arabs in the labor market, their low wages, their lower chances of finding work, and also the slower change in social norms regarding female employment. The importance that many Arab women attach to proximity of workplace to residence has become a greater limitation with the increase of the preponderance of services in employment in the economy, compared with industrial production (Brender, Pelled Levi, and Kasir, 2002).

Arguably, the wide differences stem from a tendentious and erroneous estimate of incomes in households, arising from faulty and partial reporting. In the Arab sector too a "black" economy exists, and there is no complete and valid reporting of households' income levels. In fact, the economic condition of households that

Table 12: Differences in socio-economic indices between Jewish and Arab settlements (of more than 10,000 inhabitants) on the periphery

Socio-economic variables	Jewish settlements on the periphery (average of 34 settlements: Ofaqim, Or Aqiva, Eilat, Ashdod, Ashqelon, Beer Sheva, Bet She'an, Dimona, Zikhron Ya'akov, Hadera, Haifa, Tiberias, Tirat Karmel, Yoqne'am Illit, Karmiel, Migdal HaEmeq, Nahariyya, Nazerat Illit, Nesher, Netivot, Akko, Afula, Arad, Pardes Hanna-Karkur, Safed, Qiryat Atta, Qiryat Bialik, Qiryat Gat, Qiryat Tiv'on, Qiryat Yam, Qiryat Motzkin, Qiryat Mal'akhi, Qiryat Shemona, Sderot)	Arab settlements on the periphery (average of 25 settlements: Abu Sinan, Umm Al-Fahm, Iksal, Baqa Al-Gharbiyye, Judeide-Maker, Daliyat Al-Karmel, Tur'an, Tamra, Yafi, Yirka, Kafar Kanna, Kafar Manda, Kafar Qara, Mughar, Majd Al-Kurum, Ma'ale Iron, Nazareth, Sakhnin, Arrabe, Ar'ara, Ar'ara-Banegev, Rahat, Reine, Shefar'am, Tel Sheva)	Level of statistical significance
Socio-economic cluster	5	2	p<0.001
Dependence ratio	83.0	121.8	p<0.001
Percent families with 4 children or more	11.7	36.4	p<0.001
Mean income per capita (NIS per month)	2,936	1,446	p<0.001
Percentage students in the 20-29 age group	12.9	5.9	p<0.001
Percent eligible for matriculation in the 17-18 age group	45.8	29.2	p<0.001

Source: Processing of CBS data for 2001

avoid paying full taxes on their incomes and enjoy relatively low living costs - among other things by virtue of their economic ties with the Arabs of the West Bank until the erection of the separation fence - is far better than that reported to the authorities or to the Central Bureau of Statistics. Therefore, the disparity in per capita income may in practice be not so high.

However, we still observe differences in the variables of schooling, dependence ratio, and percentage of families with many children. If we assume that the economic gaps (in incomes) between the settlements are smaller, we must conclude


that it is not the "poverty cycle" that imposes on families a lifestyle of multiplicity of children and poor education. It is perhaps another factor, not economic, that leaves children in the Arab sector less educated than in the Jewish sector on average, and that creates a dependence ratio so high. This is possibly a cultural-religious factor, which educates households in these orders of priority, and thus leaves them on the margins of Israeli society, which stands for Western values (the same thing happens in the Jewish ultra-orthodox sector in Israel). In any event, on the level of a description of the differences between the Jewish and the Arab sectors in the socio-economic domain we witness a phenomenon of severe inequality and the existence of disparities between the two people in socio-economic variables. The phenomenon exists, and no excuse can justify its existence.

Why do the Arabs of Israel live on the periphery and remain poorer there? Because they find it hard to move to the center for political, economic, cultural, and religious reasons. No wonder that the serious geopolitical tensions that exist between Jews and Arabs have been augmented by the socio-economic-educational aspect.


Those who mingle daily with this embittered population are the Jews of the periphery, and this is an additional catalyst for Jewish departure and the rapid territorial encroachment of the Arab side. The friction that exists on the periphery in its very being is expressed in aggressiveness, theft, mutual alienation, hostile looks, a sense of insecurity, and at times outbursts of violence. The inhabitants of the "Western islands" in the core do not understand what is happening, their press does not reflect this reality, but sends virtual and cosmopolitan messages, irrelevant to the real Israel. While their living standard is high, they are impervious to the periphery no less than to the poverty all around them, and the message that emerges from the islands of the core is "Everything's okay" and "The national condition is in good shape".

In several territories, such as east Jerusalem, central Galilee, Wadi Ara, and the northern Negev, the Arabs of Israel are already today the clear majority. As we saw above, if urgent Jewish-Zionist action is not taken, it may be presumed that in the not too distant future we shall get a fairly evident map of the partition of the land.


In the first stage, taking place now, in 2006, Jews are running away from all the peripheral areas and converging steadily into the Dan bloc. From Jerusalem the secular Jews are running off to the coastal plain or to Modi'in and Mevaseret Yerushalayim, and the national-religious Jews are moving to Judea and Samaria.



Map 5: Internal migration movements in Israel in 2004 (source: processing of CBS data, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2005*)



Map 6: Local councils and municipalities by socio-economic level (Source: Processing of CBS data)



Map 7: Environmental nuisances in Israel in 2004 (Source: processing of data of *Report of Environmental Poverty*, Adam Teva Ve-din, 2004)

Those who formerly were the economic mainstay of the city have left an impoverished city, polluted, with inferior services and heavy sense of loss of control. The ultra-orthodox Jews are leaving for Mevo Betar, El'ad, and Upper Modi'in. In parallel the Palestinian Arab sector is not only entering the city in large numbers, but also closing in on it with wildcat construction from the Ramallah-al-Bireh region in the north through Michmash -Anata-Arab Sawahra spreading through the Judean desert, to Beyt Suhur-Bethlehem-Beyt Jalah-Batir and Husayn.

Convergence to the Dan bloc is also from the farther and nearer north (including Haifa), and, of course, from the settlements of the Jewish periphery in the south (see Map 5).

CHAPTER THREE

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CENTER AS A RESULT OF THE CONVERGENCE OF THE JEWS OF ISRAEL INTO GREATER TEL AVIV

So far we have pointed to the collapse of the periphery on the one hand and the growing strength of Tel Aviv on the other. But this reality has additional implications. First of all, even now it is adversely affecting the citizens of greater Tel Aviv, and in the not distant future it will harm them still more, in every respect. Below we enumerate some of these effects.

Damage to Israel's carrying capacity

The result of the convergence into the Tel Aviv space is that Israel-Tel Aviv is approaching very close to the limit of its carrying capacity. This feature is salient mostly on the coastal plain whose focus is the city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. We should note that human density in Israel is the highest in the Western world, and if the Negev density is not considered it is several times higher still. For a Western society, which consumes terrain without limit, this is a warning light: without room for national infrastructure and open spaces, needed to preserve the quality of life of a Western state, Israel is hurtling toward a place among the states of the third world. This means ceasing to be, because it is doubtful that Israel could absorb immigrants from the Western world, and the strong one in the society are fleeing, and will continue to flee, from here to a better world.

In Israel we have reached the limit of carrying capacity in many domains: the transport system, the systems of garbage disposal, sewage, and flood prevention in the major cities. This leads to destruction of the beaches, the disappearance of the dunes, eradication of agriculture (which is first and foremost green in color, a culture of a people and a defensive instrument, and only lastly an economic branch), to the disappearance of open spaces, to the collapse of the physical planning system on the national and municipal levels, to the decline in relations between person and person, to huge social gaps between populations in the same city and between the center of the country and its margins.

And principally, in Israel of 2006 there is no law and no law enforcement. A society lives here large parts (and possibly all) of which evince no sign of state

sovereignty, and disorder reigns over all. The justice system, which is also detached from the reality of the periphery and the borders, does not function and its damage is terrible: crime and violence, absence of a culture of vehicle driving, illegal building, illegal commerce - with all that these imply. The fear is that as a result of the continuing high natural increase rate everything we have described will grow far worse, and will drag Israel down deep into the Third World. This is already no longer the beautiful Jewish Zionist state that our grandparents and parents dreamed of, and for which they fought and we are still fighting.

Collapse of the transport system

Efficient transport systems serve important social and economic purposes. Employment opportunities, housing, leisure areas, and shopping precincts become accessible through them. However, when the transport system passes the limit of its carrying capacity, negative implications are created to the point of harm to human health and environmental balance (Ministry of Environment, 2005).

The transport system is an extremely vital factor in moving the wheels of society and the economy. Despite Israel's integration into the global economy, production and conveyance of goods are still not done over the Internet, and the need for highways and railroads is tangible. As the ability for rapid access to work places and educational institutions is harmed due to the collapse of the transport system, and because of a transport infrastructure that does not meet the needs, so are egalitarianism and growth in the economy damaged. Severe traffic congestion, that causes labor and commodities to spend an inordinate amount of time on the road, is not particularly conducive to productivity growth. Reduced traffic congestion would lead to greater efficiency in production and contribute to improved productivity and faster economic growth. Similarly, a developed transport infrastructure befitting the needs of the modern economy contributes to greater proximity between the periphery and the center, reduces the real-estate differentials, and contributes to social integration (Ben-David 2003a, 2003b).

Convergence of the population into the center whittles down the chances of breaking the cycle of collapse of transportation in Israel. As the population in the restricted space of Tel Aviv grows, so do its demands for transportation solutions, and the cost of the solutions soars constantly. And of course, the few resources invested time after time in the Tel Aviv space at the expense of the periphery dwindle all the time. All cost-benefit calculations look absurd when weighed against the advantages of population dispersal, not only for the state but above all to lighten the burden on Tel Aviv itself.

Among the chief environmental implications arising from the transport system over-reaching its carrying capacity one may note air pollution and noise nuisances. The release of pollution in city centers exposes the public to air pollutants that cause a rise in mortality and illness, mostly diseases of the respiratory tract and blood and coronary vessels (Ministry of Environment, 2005). Noise damage due by transport cause the population suffering, and is expressed in a fall in apartment prices around airports and main highways, especially in the center of the country. Many land areas occupied by roads and parking lots limit and cut down the open space, and block the soil to water infiltration. This feature is the most grave in the central area, where there is a shortage of open terrain and the density of road vehicles is constantly on the rise.

Here too the conclusion is plain: for the good of greater Tel Aviv itself the pressure on it must be reduced, by dispersing the population to the distant periphery and reducing economic dependence on it.

Environmental nuisances (see Map 7)

Soil pollution

In Israel today more than 500 sites of soil pollution are recorded, and about half of this number (248) are in the Tel Aviv district, the smallest in the country in area. The Jerusalem district has 80 polluted sites, the Haifa district 59, the northern district 55, the southern district 39, and the central district 37 (Ministry of Environment, 2005). Soil pollution has far-reaching environmental and health implications, including pollution of water sources, because soluble components of the pollutant seep through the soil and infect the groundwater.

Noise pollution

59% of the residents of Tel Aviv-Jaffa city are disturbed by noise pollution in the city (Nature Protection Society, 2005). Many noises are experienced subjectively as irritants even if they do not involve injury to health. The problem of noise will only grow worse, and the difference between public expectations regarding noise prevention and its place in the order of priorities of the authorities will become even wider (Ministry of Environment, 2005).

Sewage

Urban sewage is the greatest water pollutant in Israel. Still today, raw or semi-

treated sewage is flushed into rivers and wadis, even in some of the towns of the center of Israel. Responsibility for urban sewage treatment lies with the local authorities, but many of them are not prepared to shoulder the establishment and maintenance of systems of channeling, treating, and disposing of their waste. Sewage that is not treated, or is given low-quality treatment, pollutes the groundwater, rivers, soil, and the sea, and harms vegetation (Ministry of Environment, 2005).

About a quarter of the quantity of sewage in the state is channeled to the Dan sewage purification plant (DSPP). In 2003 only 63% of the total sewage was treated on the level required by law. By as early as 2010 the volume of sewage is expected to increase by 11% over the 2005 figure (Ministry of Environment, 2005). How much of it will be treated then?

Waste material

The amount of waste material in Israel has increased at a rate of about 5% annually (Ministry of Environment, 2005). In the Tel Aviv district an average of 2.04 kilograms of waste per person are produced daily, while the national average is 1.59 kg per person per day. The Jerusalem district and the northern district produce less than the national average: Jerusalem 1.31 kg and the north 1.53 kg per person per day on average (CBS, 2005). In all, garbage accumulates at a volume of more than five million tons a year.

These mountains of trash, in addition to the increase in population density and shrinkage of available spaces sharpen the difficulties on the way to creating new sites for garbage disposal. The inevitable result is shortage of available space for garbage burial. In recent years the greater Tel Aviv trash has been transported to the Duda'im site near Beer Sheva. Even if this does not incur immediate damage, one gets the impression that the Negev is the garbage can of the Dan bloc.

The solution of garbage recycling, as is common in developed states, has not yet found its way to Israel (Ministry of Environment 2005).

Shortage of open spaces

In recent years the dwindling of the foremost environmental resource, open space, has become evident. Israel is becoming one of the most densely population states on earth, with all the dire environmental implications that this carries: elimination of green lungs and places for recreation and fitness of the population, prevention of penetration of water to the groundwater layers, and destruction of values of

nature, flora, fauna, and landscape, and of the cultural and historical heritage (Ministry of Environment, 2005).

The dearth of open spaces is more evident at the center. Although the built area in Israel that serves for housing is 2.7% of the area of the state, in the Tel Aviv district, the smallest, 40% serve this purpose (CBS, 2005). If the pressure on the central district does not ease, a very difficult future may be anticipated in health, aesthetics, and functioning.

Danger of migration of the strong people abroad or enclosing themselves in “western islands”

The problems described above entail social decline also, expressed in social disquiet, abundant violence, demonstrations, robbery, non-enforcement of the law, and undermining of personal safety - manifestations that have been constantly on the rise since the early 1990s. Without doubt, such an ongoing state of affairs will be unacceptable to a portion of the Jewish citizens whose lifestyle, economy, and expectations are similar to those of citizens of the West, and who can easily be absorbed into the West. They will weigh up migration to countries in which the quality of life is higher (USA, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe).

Another possibility is that the strong will remain in Israel (for the plague of terror and anti-Semitism is raising its head the world over), but with increasing indifference on the part of the groups in the core to what is taking place in the state generally, and to critical issues such as participation in elections and enlistment in the IDF and reserve duty in particular. Some transfer their money abroad, purchase apartments abroad, or acquire an additional passport, even in countries with a terrible anti-Semitic past such as Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. To these should be added economic crises, high unemployment, and hundreds of thousands of parasites who suck out the nation's sap and suppress the middle class, which is the backbone of every democracy and the guarantee of economic prosperity. Some see these processes as national peril in the full sense of the word; without doubt they indeed strike at the stability of the state.

Most of the maladies we have described lie in the Tel Aviv space. In addition, the feature is taking shape of self-enclosure in the rich suburbs, namely residential areas surrounded by a wall, with a sentry at the gate examining all who enter and all who depart. An example is the building being erected on the site of the old Ramat Aviv hotel. We have not enlarged on the matter of those who refuse to enlist

in army service, and the cosmopolitan and anti-Zionist press, whose focal point is Tel Aviv city (Appendix 2). Proper dispersal of the population will make it possible to deal with a considerable part of these nuisances, whose titles alone have been set down here.

CHAPTER FOUR

HOW TO STOP THE CONVERGENCE TO TEL AVIV: PRACTICAL PROPOSALS

Geostrategic challenges in the Land of Israel 2006-2020


Number sensitive areas within Israel have to be strengthened so as to interrupt the demographic trends reviewed above (in Map 8 we portray visually what has to be done).

On the coastal plain

- Reinforce Akko as a Jewish city.
- Reinforce the Jewish settlement around the Gaza Strip, and in particular prevent contiguity of Bedouin concentrations and between them and Mount Hebron.
- Insert the recommended wedges in Yizre'el Valley, between Galilee and Samaria, and between the Gaza Strip and the Bedouin in the south. If the Jews fail in this, we will imperceptibly have Arab territorial contiguity from Biranit in the north through Galilee, Samaria, Jerusalem, Hebron the Bedouins of the south, and the Gaza Strip, and the Jews will be squeezed into the coastal plain alone. We demonstrated the extent of the danger of this in previous chapters.
- Reinforce "Kokhav" settlements from the Um al-Fahm region to Beer Sheva and eliminate pressure from across the border in the region of Israel's "narrow waist".

Inland

- Reinforce the space between the Ta'anakh settlements and Gilboa, in order to prevent Arab unification from Galilee to the Jenin area.
- Reinforce Jewish Jerusalem across all its parts, and stop talk of the "whole Jerusalem", which already in 2006 has about 400,000 Palestinians (legal and illegal), while the strong Jews are deserting it.
- Strengthen the Israel-Egypt border in view of processes developing in northern



Map 8: Geostrategic challenges in the Land of Israel, 2006-2020

Sinai and the scope of terrorist and criminal activity on either side of this frontier.

- Put an end to the tragedy of the northern Negev - a personal tragedy for hundreds of thousands of poor, disaffected and embittered Bedouins, and a national tragedy for the Jews who are steadily losing the south and endangering the defensive infrastructure there.
- Judaize Galilee and the Negev at the expense of Tel Aviv by all ways and means. This act will in any case assist all the other sectors on the periphery.

How is the accelerated development of Tel Aviv to be slowed?

Actions taken in the 1950s and 1960s are not effective in the 21st century. Government strength has declined against global and local economic forces. Nevertheless, the government can still restrain, encourage, and change stichous moves. Recall too that we (still) live in a democratic society, so directives typical of totalitarian regimes are not to be imposed. However, as we have tried to prove, Tel Avivian Israel is in existential danger in a range of 15-20 years, and everything must be done to reroute the path away from collapse and loss.

Every society that wishes to improve its living standard needs an open and competitive market. This is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. The government must recognize the existence of market failures and the need to contend with them, and it behooves it to construct human and physical infrastructures that will allow all citizens of the state to exhaust the potential inherent in them (Ben-David 2005a).

Following are several suggestions to slow down the processes we have indicated, based on the data we have presented. Action must be frontal and long-term (and not isolated measures in the short term, which are useless).

Dispersal of public institutions

Within three to five years all the national institutions located in Tel Aviv must be transferred to Jerusalem (including military installations at Hazer Gelilot and some of the offices of the ministry of defense); all other state offices located in Tel Aviv have to be closed or reduced. The move of the IDF has to be hastened - its city of training bases, the air force, intelligence, and military industries. **New prestigious neighborhoods must not be constructed on lands evacuated by the IDF**, for these will only intensify the populating of greater Tel Aviv.

Transport to approximate the periphery to the center

Speedy action must be taken to advance the most modern transport system to the periphery, including freeways, railroads, and a second airport in the south. Improvement of means of transport linking development areas to the center of the country will bring workers closer to centers of study, professional training, and government institutions, and the best teaching forces to the development areas (Bergman and Marom, 2005).

Funds for these purposes will be taken from the national budget and found at the cost of stopping projects in greater Tel Aviv. There is room to impose a tax on "your being a Tel Avivian". This money will finance the enterprise of population dispersal for the good of Israel and to improve the living quality of the people of the periphery. The rich of the core will be obliged to pay for the closure of the gaps. State subsidizing of every national-public enterprise in greater Tel Aviv will end, and these will be urged to move to the towns of the periphery. This applies to cultural institutions, theaters, orchestras, colleges, and so on. It is necessary to force - by economic means - the creative powers of Israel to move to the margins, and to work from there, and to go to greater Tel Aviv only for visits, not the reverse.

Schooling and higher education

Subsidies for the universities in greater Tel Aviv must be stopped, and universities must be fostered only in the peripheral settlements: in the first place, Ben-Gurion University in Beer Sheva and the colleges in Karmiel, Safed, and Qiryat Shemona. It is especially important that the government act to increase the human capital and the infrastructure capital in these parts, including nurturing of education and its quality, a matter that will also reduce inequality in distribution of revenues in the economy (Bergman and Marom, 2005). The education system must work to raise the level of schooling among children in low-income populations, thereby reducing disparities in their achievements. An improvement of the education system will provide the means for the future successful integration of children from poor families into the workforce, and will thus contribute to narrowing the gaps and their breaking free of the cycle of poverty (Flug and Kasir, 2001). Naturally, most poor and uneducated families live on the national periphery.

Improvement of health services on the periphery

Health services on the periphery are to be improved, and at issue here is not just investment of capital but the meaningful advance in workforce that will wish to

move there. The best doctors want Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. The title of a piece in the daily *Ha'aretz* by Basok (2006) intimates "corruption" or "crimes" committed by the minister. And what is written there? "The minister chose to give preference in the 2006 budget to the hospitals of the periphery"! Scandalous! We wonder why the Tel Aviv editor finds it necessary to present this positive story under such a suspect title.

Pressure on the media to move to the periphery

In light of events of the PR conference known as the "Herzliya Conference" we suggest another drastic step: all office-holders (civilian and in uniform) will be prohibited from making public appearances in greater Tel Aviv, but only in Jerusalem and the rest of the peripheral settlements. If this accomplished, the universities of greater Tel Aviv and the interdisciplinary institutes there will be forced to look for partners on the periphery, where their events will be held. This will oblige the Herzliya people and the wealthy of Tel Aviv to rub shoulders with their colleagues in Afula, Karmiel, Sderot, Yeruham, Qiryat Shemona, and Jerusalem. This is possible, legal, easy, and very effective.

Such a decision will also impel the Tel Aviv media to emerge from the Herzliya hothouse and make their way to the peripheral settlements. On arrive there they will encounter landscapes, people, problems, and borders of whose existence they had not known till then. When much is reported on the disorder on the periphery, on the wide-open borders there (the border of Egypt, for example), on the abandonment of the periphery, then even the law courts will awaken, including the Supreme Court, and they will realize that there is a fissure between the irrelevant "players" of the Holland-Belgium type in the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv courts and the Middle Eastern reality around Har Harif, Nitsana, Ein Hatseva, Laqiya, Kisfiyya, Beer Sheva, Wadi Ara, and the like. Such acts, as well as massive government encouragement of industries to move from greater Tel Aviv to the more distant margins, will bring in their wake accountants, attorneys, and the other elements of Tel Aviv power to the periphery.

Only when Beer Sheva passes the threshold of half a million inhabitants, and Haifa and the north halt the desertion by Jews - only then will there be an easing of these emergency restrictions. A proper and aggressive information campaign will clarify to the citizens of greater Tel Aviv (the intelligent and the Zionists among them) that these measures are essential for the salvation of Israel and the salvation of Tel Aviv itself.

All that we have stated will be worth nothing unless in parallel law enforcement is enhanced in each every domain, with zero tolerance and enormous efforts to restore Israel to the developed world in the area of education, environment, and others.

Awareness of capitalists of the crisis we are discussing, compulsion on the media to emerge from their bubble, suppression of the cynicism in academe, and pressure on the politicians and Members of Knesset - all these will bring about a change. The change can be achieved only by leaders of stature, wise, fair, and Zionist, and not in any other way.

Bringing the Arab population closer

A part of the effort to save the periphery is of course connected to improvement of the quality of life in the Arab sector. Ben-David (2005) suggests beginning to invest in educational, physical, and health infrastructures of the Arab population in Israel, to stop the civil discrimination against them, and to allow men and women to achieve the highest education and workplaces suited to their talents. Similarly, they must be provided with all the same rights received by the Jews in the country - whose like no other Arab population in the Middle East enjoys, and to impose on them the same duties, including service for the benefit of their state, for they too have something to be proud of, and they too have much to lose, should something bad happen to the State of Israel (Ben-David, 2005b).

CONCLUSION

THE SHRINKING OF JEWISH SOVEREIGNTY

In parallel to the convergence of the Jews into greater Tel Aviv, there remains on the periphery of Israel a weak and aging Jewish population, and alongside it a poor, but strengthening, Arab population, possessing great self-confidence. The image of the periphery is negative, which makes a new policy of population dispersal difficult; moreover, assets to which it was possible to direct Jews are steadily dwindling there. The hope that greater Tel Aviv will spill over to the margins, like the spillover to Herzliya, Rishon Le-Zion, Netanya and Kfar Bilu, lies in a mistaken evaluation of the timetables for possible spilling over to the remote periphery, and what is happening there in the meantime! Beyond the demographic increase of the Arabs of Palestine there is a wide-ranging spread of this sector in all areas of Israel's margins, especially in the northern Negev. This is a process that is closing in on Tel Aviv state, and squeezing it more and more until the moment it collapses.

If the Jews of Israel remain in the greater Dan bloc, it will become a city-state without a logistic hinterland, without green lungs, without room to develop, impinged on all sides by infiltration and terror acts. The days of its life will be numbered, just until an absolute Palestinian-Arab victory. According to our assessment, if no drastic step is taken to change the course of events, such a catastrophe is liable to fall in 15 to 20 years (forecast made in 2006). That is, round about 2020 Israel will be in existential danger, and not because of Iran, Hamas or Arab armies, but because of the blunder of the leaders of greater Tel Aviv, among them the short-sighted possessors of capital, the unseeing media, the cynical academics, and politicians and public leaders of the lowest rank.

The Arabs of Israel have many reasons to want change: the Zionist anthem and flag are not to their liking, and the control by Jews of Muslims is unacceptable in this part of the world. Over the years thousands of dunams of land have been confiscated from them. First, they and their brothers lost 380-400 settlements. On their ruins stand in glory flourishing Jewish settlements, for example Ramat Aviv Gimel (formerly Sheikh Munis), the Andromeda vicinity in Jaffa, Sarona, Jelil, Herzliya, Eyn Kerem in Jerusalem, Ramla, and Lod, lower Haifa, Tiberias and Beyt She'an, Qiryat Shemona and Zippori, Kibbutz Sasa, Kibbutz Har'el, and

hundreds more. At the start of the path the Arabs of Israel lived under military government and constant fear of a repeated expulsion. Most of them live on the geographic periphery of the state, which is, as stated, relatively weaker economically than the strong center; like them are the Jews of Alqosh and Zar'it, Avivim, Yeruham, and Dimona. All the peripheral settlements are deprived, but the Arabs more. Neglect of the periphery and weakening of the Zionist sovereignty there stirs up Arab forces to bring about changes in the Zionist map of Israel.

We fear that as the attempt to halt the destructive process described above is put off, so will it obligate the taking of less democratic and acceptable measures. In other words, whoever fears for Israeli democracy must act now, for its days are dwindling in the new geopolitical circumstances of Israel.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Herzliya conference: A model of all the maladies of Israel; or, "at the Herzliya conference we formally founded the state of Tel Aviv"

by Arnon Soffer

The Herzliya Conference, which will convene for the sixth time in Herzliya (January 2006) reflects all the ills that we have reported in this documents. Here Tel Aviv wealth combines with Tel Aviv media, which together dictate the Tel Aviv (= national) agenda. The attachment of these to Herzliya is accomplished through a brilliant illusion at the hands of a slick impresario. Having no alternative, the Israeli political leadership joins the media and the capital, and these are led wherever they are led - in this case straight to a hotel on the seashore of Tel Aviv-Herzliya. Thus the politicians who participated in this conference betrayed the sickly capital city of Israel, which is in desperate need of succor, even if only in its image, while spurning any ethical decency; they betrayed the national periphery; and they betrayed Zionism itself. It is as if they said to us: "Not at Basle did we found the Jewish state, but at Herzliya we founded the State of Tel Aviv".

The Herzliya Conference adopted the rules of the international conference at Davos (except that Davos is on the periphery of Switzerland, and Herzliya is in the middle of the core). The human mix at Herzliya stirs capitalists (some of them under police investigation) in with the shallow and indolent Tel Aviv media, which will never move as far away as Karmiel, Sderot, Haifa, or Beer Sheva, with a collection of party heads and other key figures. Naturally, here too the visage of the impresario is not absent, inviting his politician friends to deliver their speeches.

The agenda at the Herzliya Conference is awe-inspiring. The morning begins with an important personality, followed by two or three sessions of nothing very much with marvelous titles, on condition that the speakers have paid a small fortune to appear for five or six minutes. Toward noon another important personality appears, who has come down from the shadowy capital of Israel to the Herzliya seaside, and then a well-appointed lunch is served to the guests at the taxpayer's expense (for the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and the prime minister's office have also paid for this shameful display).

After lunch two or three more sessions of nothing very much are held, and again

there emerges from the shadows an important political personality, who rounds off the day. The state is all agog, the streets deserted, because Mr. X will today deliver his "Herzliya address" and will speak the most fateful words to this ill nation. Where? Not, God forbid, in the Knesset. Not in Jerusalem, Heaven forefend. Not at a serious important academic conference - but on an incline running down to the Mediterranean, at the center of the Tel Aviv core. There is no shame and there is no disgrace, and all is permitted, because no politician would agree to commit suicide by making his speech in Jerusalem, without the media, where the potential audience is ultra-orthodox Jews and Arabs, who constitute the majority in the sickly capital.

Would any political journalist travel to the Knesset or the National Convention Hall (Binyaney Ha'uma) in Jerusalem (albeit in the western part of the city) to hear talks at some conference or other? Can anyone imagine this conference being held in Karmiel, in Safed, in Dimona? Would the press show up there? Would TV channels 1, 2, or 10, even know where Dimona or Karmiel is? Would any serious politician get to these godforsaken townships? And how many of the wealthy of Savyon, Herzliya Pituah, Ramat Hasharon, and north Tel Aviv would trouble themselves to go there? In the words of the satirical show *Wonderful Country*, "You trying to be funny?!"

But since the Herzliya conference takes place in Herzliya, and the agenda is set by a Tel Aviv impresario for the Tel Aviv wealthy and its politicians, and under the backing of the Tel Aviv media, its agenda is Tel Avivian too - for Tel Avivians, and the national periphery - zilch! At the 2006 conference there was a refreshing innovation: for anyone interested a tour of the national periphery was organized (since the Sderot conference "stole" the Negev from the Tel Aviv impresario, he chose Galilee, showing you how sensitive he was to the northern periphery). What is to be done? I read the schedule of the day trip to Galilee: drive to Galilee, look at the view here and there, taste wines, coffee and cake, before this breakfast and after it lunch, and let's go - home, back to the Tel Aviv homeland! Thus dues were rendered to the Israeli periphery, so let's not have any complaints.

In such a reality, what reason should any normal, responsible, serious, Zionist person have for living in the national desert? What future has one there? Who will be interested in one, or listen to one talk about failures and achievements?

The Herzliya Conference is not responsible for the betrayal of the national periphery, but it is yet another example of it, and a small catalyst of the approaching disorder.

Appendix 2: The *Ha'aretz* daily newspaper - a Tel Aviv classic

by Arnon Soffer

If the Herzliya conference does not adequately represent Tel Avivism as a phenomenon/sickness of Israeli society, the senior editors of the daily *Ha'aretz* complement the picture of viewing the world in general, and Israel in particular, from the Tel Aviv center alone, with a display of ignorance and/or blindness and/or twisted outlook in every respect of the periphery and the borders of Israel.

As many of this paper's readers belong to the Tel Aviv elite - the well-off, the CEOs, the lawyers, the accountants, the senior army officers, and the creative forces - it is clear that this paper shapes the Tel Aviv ("Israeli") outlook on the subject of borders, Palestinians, the Arabs of Israel, society and economy, agriculture, privatization, and capital. Every particle of the real Israel finds expression in this important newspaper, and the height of Tel Aviv cynicism is to be found in its supplements titled *Shamenet* (cream), *The Marker*, or *The Driver* (the last two both using the English words: remember Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and his struggle for Hebrew? Remember!) and to a lesser degree in the daily feature *Galeria* (gallery) - all this, of course, alongside lip service to the poor of the land and massive support for the parties of the left and the esteemed Palestinian people! The burden of proof for these harsh words rests on me.

In his article in *The Marker* of 14 February 2006 Omer Mo'av argues: "The development of the Negev and Galilee - a war of the last century". I am convinced that such an article could have been written only by someone not familiar with the twists and turns of the Jewish-Arab conflict, or with the processes taking place on Israel's national periphery. The population of the national periphery is leaving for greater Tel Aviv and the remaining population there is primarily Muslim.

If all the inhabitants of France went to live in Paris and its suburbs there would be no danger that the periphery of France would pass to a different sovereignty, but with us, in contrast to any Western state, if Jews do not live on the periphery of Israel this periphery is liable to slip out of Israeli sovereignty and pass to other hands. We are witness to the occurrence of such slipping processes even now, in the spaces of the northern Negev and in the hills of Um al-Fahm, and even the events of October 2000 attest to this!

A Jewish presence on the national periphery is vital for the preservation of their

Jewish sovereignty, and this matter has nothing to do with the demographic issue or the question of limitation of childbirth, as implied by the text of Omer Mo'av.

Omer Mo'av's notion of keeping Galilee green as a space for the residents of the center to go on trips, without any need for Jewish settlement in Galilee, is an idea that does not suit our reality. It is also worth recalling that the housing culture of the Arab sector is one of private homes that swallow up land area, and in the absence of law enforcement Galilee will steadily become one large suburbia, with its green trodden underfoot.

There is another facet to the matter: conceding the development of Galilee and the Negev means conceding population dispersal, and the significance of this is the concentration of the Jewish population of Israel in the Tel Aviv area. Such a concentration is liable seriously to harm the quality of life of the residents of the Dan bloc and will require great resources to solve the problems arising from it. Economically, the promotion of the periphery and population dispersal is likely to be a cheaper solution! Even the government of France, which as stated is not threatened by the danger of territories slipping out of its sovereignty, understood long ago that the policy of population dispersal is vital for preserving the quality of life, and it indeed follows such a policy!

After the inauguration of the Rabin Center for the Study of Israel, the journalist Esther Zandberg of *Ha'aretz* wrote that the building, which is truly impressive in her eyes, although it does not suit the modest character of the man it is named for, is located - Heavens above - next to the center of the General Security Service, "a place that anyone who is concerned for his life will keep well away from", in her words. I read the words and I cannot believe it: the wonderful young people of Israel labor night and day to protect this Tel Aviv journalist, and she likens its headquarters to some KGB dungeon, or perhaps to a still worse police force in central Europe in the black days! Only one who lives in Tel Aviv, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of Jews, whose living standard is so high that she can "drop by" an art gallery in Paris or London, and return thence directly to Tel Aviv state, who is an *ignoramus* in matters of the Israel-Arab conflict, and impervious to reality, can speak such slander and be so dim-witted regarding Israel's state of security.

In an earlier piece in the same journal (26 September 2004) Zandberg complains that we Jews of Israel are anxious to Judaize Galilee (God forbid!) and that we see the Arabs of Israel as an existential threat. How marvelous to detach oneself

from the daily essence on the national periphery and to be like a righteous gentile in Tel Aviv.

Akiva Eldar is a senior journalist with the same paper, and in his incessant brain-washing he discloses to us, from an oh-so-Tel Avivian viewpoint, that there is a partner, there is someone to talk to. He has no concept of the economic gap of 1:20 between the Israeli Jew and his Palestinian neighbor across the fence (between a Mexican and an American the gap is only 1:4!). He has no idea about the Western Wall, Temple Mount, Jerusalem, the Right of Return, corridors, "erasing" the trauma of the *nakba*, non-acceptance of Jews in the Middle East for religious, social, national, economic and other reasons. He informs us on 2 December 2005, and again on 9 January 2006, and again on 23 January 2006, and again on 30 January 2006 that there is a partner, because there is someone to talk to! A journalist who apparently does not understand what the conflict is, a Tel Aviv cosmopolitan detached from the borders, from the national periphery and what is going on there, in his articles influences the Tel Aviv elite and mingles for it reality with virtual stories torn out of the Middle East. When reality hits him in the face, instead of admitting his error of not understanding the Middle Eastern text, he always finds the guilty ones: the Jews! It's no concern of his that they want to live, so they build fences, they want a homeland, they want room to live. This he does not grasp, because what do room for garbage disposal, electricity, roads, green lungs, safe borders, and Jewish history have to do with him? What does he know about what's going on in the northern Negev at this very moment? Does not this intellectual from Dizengova-corner-Arlozorova understand that even in peace arrangements the processes we have described in this booklet will continue unchecked?

And here is what he writes with Prof. Yisrael Bar-Tal on 1 July 2005: "And as for the existential threat against Israel [whose existence they reject out of hand - A.S.]: this is **the central pathology of Jewish society**" [my emphasis - A.S.]. This sentence is terrible in its ignorance of security matters, and in the history of the 20th century in general and of our people in particular.

On 20 December 2005 Danny Rabinowitz wrote an article, one of many on the Arab sector in Israel, and as usual *Ha'aretz* was delighted to print it. This article displays wholesale ignorance of the facts and the historical background. Rabinowitz writes about Sakhnin as the capital of the rural region in Galilee, about the need for Sakhnin to expand. He ignores the wretched culture of the Arab sector of spreading out through low single-family building, at a magnitude at which the population cannot provide an answer for its own infrastructural needs. He apparently

regrets that the Jews won in 1948 and transferred the deserted lands to the property of the nation. I do not share in his grief! He presents corrupt data about the percentage of territory in the hands of the Arabs of Israel, for he misleads the reader regarding the desert, which accounts for 60% and more of the area of Israel. He misleads the reader regarding the Bedouin townships, not telling him that about 30 of the Bedouin townships were built and recognized in the north. I could go on and on. Only a Tel Avivian cut off from Israeli reality and Zionist history could write like this in a journal that aspires to be for thinking people, intellectuals, and peace-lovers!


And *The Marker*? Does it take an interest in the Israeli periphery of the 18 richest Tel Aviv families (all of them!) and in those who, rightly, would like to join them (all from Tel Aviv!)? And if this were not enough, affluent Tel Aviv society has to decide which expensive car they should buy this year, so a new Hebrew supplement was born, *The Driver*.

Thus they report to the denizens of Tel Aviv State about the cream and the money, and they report to them that there is a partner, and there is someone to talk to, and only we, the wicked, cause distress to the guilt-free Palestinian people, and thus they fashion the national agenda. From here the way is short to recommending cutting the IDF down in size, suppressing the General Security Service, giving up agriculture (the classic representative of the group that stands for such a policy is Nehemia Strasler of *Ha'aretz* - a policy, should it be realized would be a security and aesthetic catastrophe. This Tel Aviv economist does not understand that agriculture is an economic matter only after its environmental, security, aesthetic, and cultural advantages). And naturally he demands yielding the national periphery, because by going there we do injustice to the citizens with equal rights who seek our good. In short, leave us with Tel Aviv and its culture, and everything will sort itself out!

Several research studies conducted recently in Israel found a correlation between your being a Tel Avivian and cosmopolitanism, and preference given to problems of society, while among the residents of the Jewish periphery the agenda is headed by preference for questions of security.

Appendix 3: Complementary data on deprivation of the national periphery as against the preference for "Tel Aviv State"

Incidence of poverty after transfer payments and direct taxes in percent, 2003



Source: CBS data for 2005

Monthly expenditure on consumption, and main expenditure items in NIS, 2004

	Jerusalem	Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Haifa	Rishon LeZion
Expenditure per household, NIS	10,029	11,231	8,767	11,724
Of which				
Meals outside the home	139	491	194	207
Dental treatment	138	126	105	179
Public transport	151	116	101	47
Cigarettes, tobacco, and smoking needs	85	99	64	90
Per capita expenditure, NIS	2,696	4,829	3,525	3,815

Source: CBS data for 2005

Ownership of households of permanent goods in percent, 2004

	Jerusalem	Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Haifa	Rishon LeZion
One car at least	43	55	50	73
Computer	50	61	58	72
Internet subscription	26	49	45	60
Cable or satellite TV subscription	40	80	79	88
DVD system	15	26	20	42
Two or more cellular phones	36	49	50	66

Source: CBS data for 2005


Appendix 4: Population distribution in Israel according to district, sub-district, and natural region, 1962-2004 (in percent)

District, sub-district (S.D.) and natural region	31.12.1962		31.12.1972		4.6.1983		31.12.1995		31.12.2004	
	Total	Thereof Jews	Total	Thereof Jews	Total	Thereof Jews	Total	Thereof Jews	Total	Thereof Jews
Israel population (thousands)	2,331.8	2,068.9	3,232.3	2,755.5	4,037.6	3,350.0	5,619.0	4,549.5	6,869.5	5,237.6
Jewish population in Israel (percentages)		88.7		85.2		82.9		80.9		76.2
Israel population (percentages)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Jerusalem district:	8.7	9.5	10.8	9.6	11.7	10.3	11.8	10.6	12.1	10.9
Judean Mountains	8.0	8.8	10.2	8.8	11.1	9.6	11.2	9.8	11.0	9.5
Judean Foothills	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.4
Northern district¹:	15.6	10.2	15.2	9.5	16.2	9.7	16.9	10.3	17.0	9.9
<i>Safed S.D.</i>	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.5
Hula Basin	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.6
Eastem Upper Galilee	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7
Hazor Region	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
<i>Kinneret S.D.</i>	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2
Kinnerot	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.0
Eastern Lower Galilee ²	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.2
<i>Yizre'el S.D.</i>	5.6	3.5	5.6	3.5	5.8	3.4	6.0	3.6	6.1	3.5
Bet She'an Basin	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5
Harod Valley	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.15	0.2	0.14	0.1	0.14	0.1
Kokhav Plateau ³	0.15	0.07	0.14	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.15	0.04	0.15	0.04
Yizre'el Basin	} 1.5	} 1.6	} 1.3	} 1.4	} 1.2	} 1.4	0.9	} 1.4	0.9	1.0
Yoqne'am Region							0.3		0.4	0.5
Menashe Plateau	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.07
Nazareth Tir'an Mts.	2.8	0.6	3.3	1.0	3.6	1.1	4.0	1.4	4.1	1.3
<i>Akko S.D.</i>	5.9	2.6	6.2	2.7	6.8	2.9	7.3	3.3	7.5	3.3
Shefar'am Region ⁴	} 2.2	} 0.02	} 2.5	} 0.2	} 3.2	} 0.5	2.3	} 0.9	2.4	0.2
Karmiel Region ⁵							1.4		1.5	0.8
Yehi'am Region ⁶	} 1.1	} 0.3	0.8	0.2	0.95	0.2	1.1	0.4	1.2	0.5
Elon Region ⁷			0.25	0.1	0.25	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Nahariyya Region	} 2.6	} 2.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.1
Akko Region			1.4	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.6
<i>Golan S.D.</i>	-	-	0.02	-	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.3
Hermon Region	-	-	-	-	} 0.4	} 0.05	} 0.3	} 0.05	0.15	0.004
Northern Golan	-	-	-	-					0.2	0.04
Middle Golan	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.15	0.13	0.15
Southern Golan	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.1	0.08	0.1
Haifa District:	16.8	16.4	15.4	15.2	14.2	13.8	13.2	12.6	12.4	11.6
<i>Haiifa S.D.</i>	12.5	13.1	11.3	12.3	10.1	11.1	8.8	9.6	7.7	8.3
<i>Hadera S.D.</i>	4.3	3.3	4.0	2.9	4.1	2.7	4.4	3.0	4.7	3.3
Hof HaKarmel	0.3		0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2

Zikhron Ya'aqov Region	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Alexander Mt.	0.4	0.03	1.0	0.02	1.2	0.03	1.2	0.04	1.4	0.09
Hadera Region	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.6
Central District:	18.3	19.2	18.4	19.9	20.6	22.8	21.6	24.3	23.5	27.2
<i>Sharon S.D.</i>	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.7	4.5	4.9	4.7	5.2	5.1
West Sharon	} 4.7	} 4.4	} 4.5	} 4.3	} 4.7	} 4.5	} 4.7	} 4.7	} 3.9	} 4.9
East Sharon										
<i>Petah Tiqwa S.D.</i>	6.1	6.6	6.5	7.3	7.4	8.5	7.6	8.9	8.0	9.6
Southern Sharon	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.3	3.2	3.8	3.3	4.1
Petah Tiqwa Region	4.0	4.4	4.4	5.0	4.6	5.2	4.4	5.1	4.7	5.5
<i>Ramla S.D.</i>	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.7	4.2
<i>Rehovot S.D.</i>	4.5	5.0	4.6	5.3	5.8	6.9	6.2	7.6	6.6	8.3
Rehovot Region	2.5	2.8	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.3	2.8	3.4	3.0	3.8
Rishon Leziyyon Region	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.6	3.0	3.6	3.4	4.2	3.6	4.5
Tel Aviv District:	31.5	35.2	28.7	33.3	24.8	29.5	20.3	24.5	17.1	21.1
Tel Aviv Region	} 31.5	} 35.2	} 28.7	} 33.3	} 24.8	} 29.5	8.4	} 24.5	7.1	8.8
Ramat Gan Region							6.4		5.5	7.0
Holon Region							5.6		4.5	5.3
Southern District:	9.1	9.4	11.5	12.1	11.9	12.9	13.7	14.5	14.3	14.8
<i>Ashqelon S.D.</i>	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.8	5.0	6.0	6.0	7.2	6.4	7.7
Mal'akhi Region	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.9
Lakhish Region	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.0
Ashdod Region	} 2.3	} 2.6	1.3	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.8	2.8	3.4
Ashqelon Region			2.0	2.3	1.8	2.2	2.0	2.4	2.0	2.4
<i>Beer Sheva S.D.</i>	5.1	4.9	6.4	6.3	6.9	6.9	7.7	7.3	7.9	7.0
Gerar Region	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6
Basor Region	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7
Beer Sheva Region	3.1	2.5	3.9	3.5	4.3	3.9	5.0	4.1	5.3	3.9
Dead Sea Region	} 0.3	} 0.3	} 0.5	} 0.5	} 0.6	} 0.6	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.02
Arava Region							0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8
Northern & Southern Negev Mt.	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.1	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.9
Judea Samaria & Gaza										
Areas (Jewish Settlements):	-	-	-	0.05	-	0.7	2.5	3.0	3.5	4.5
Judea and Samaria				} 0.05		} 0.7	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.4
Gaza Area					0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	

Source: Processing of CBS data, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various years

1. In the northern district the Jewish population constitutes a minority of 45% and the Arab population constitutes a majority of 52%.
2. In eastern Lower Galilee the Jewish population constitutes a minority of 34.4% and the Arab population constitutes a majority of 65%.
3. In Ramat Kokhav the Jewish population constitutes a minority of 22.5% and the Arab population constitutes a majority of 77.5%.
4. In the Shafr'am region the Arab population numbers 94.5%.
5. In the Karmiel region the Arab population numbers 53.2%.
6. In the Yehi'am region the Arab population numbers 65.1%.
7. In the Eylon region the Arab population numbers 63.4%.



The people of Israel are converging into Tel Aviv, abandoning the national periphery. The data we present here cry out from every line and every table. A similar process to this is occurring in all states of the world, but what is permissible there must not happen here. Israel, in allowing this development, is bringing disaster upon itself.

This is a document intended for every responsible Jewish citizen - politicians, security people, economists, capitalists and people of the stock exchange, people of culture, of the media, of academe, planners, heads of cities and local councils, and citizens in the street.

It is still not too late to change the catastrophic direction in which we are marching!