When Borders Undermine Security: What the Strait of Malacca and the Mediterranean Reveal About the Future of Maritime Security
Do larger budgets, more patrol vessels, and stronger enforcement capabilities necessarily lead to better maritime security? Not according to research by Eleanor Dayan and Prof. Aviad Rubin of the University of Haifa. Their study, published in Marine Policy with support from the Chaikin Institute for Geostrategy, identifies a fundamental paradox: the insistence on exclusive state sovereignty, combined with complex governance structures, can undermine the effectiveness of maritime security. Through case studies of the Strait of Malacca and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, the researchers call for a fundamental reassessment of how maritime security is governed
The maritime domain is one of the principal arteries of the global economy. Shipping routes facilitate the movement of goods, energy, and people between countries and continents, but they are also vulnerable to piracy, smuggling, organized crime, illicit trafficking, and other security threats.
Unlike land borders, maritime spaces are characterized by constant movement and complex jurisdictional arrangements. Vessels may pass through the territorial waters of different states, maritime zones governed by different legal regimes, and international shipping routes.
Yet while maritime threats cross borders, responsibility for addressing them often remains divided among states, law enforcement authorities, and regional organizations.
This tension lies at the heart of research conducted by Eleanor Dayan, a recipient of the 2024 Arnon Soffer Doctoral Scholarship, and Prof. Aviad Rubin of the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa.
Their study, published in the scientific journal Marine Policy, examines how the relationship between state sovereignty and governance structures affects maritime security effectiveness.
The researchers argue that effectively addressing maritime threats may require moving beyond the traditional assumption that each state should exercise exclusive authority over security within its jurisdiction.
Singapore: A Small Maritime Power Facing a Major Regional Challenge
Singapore is geographically small but plays an exceptionally important role in global maritime trade.
The study describes how Singapore has developed advanced maritime security capabilities through investment in technology, security forces, surveillance systems, and cooperation with regional and international partners.
However, the researchers identify a fundamental limitation: some of the underlying drivers of maritime crime in the Strait of Malacca originate beyond Singapore's jurisdiction.
Poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, and tensions between states can create conditions conducive to maritime crime, even when sophisticated enforcement capabilities are available.
One of the study's recommendations is therefore to complement maritime enforcement with investment in coastal community development and improved living conditions in areas where security threats originate.
The researchers argue that economic and social development should be understood as an integral component of maritime security policy rather than as a separate policy domain.
Frontex: Does a Larger Budget Mean Greater Security?
The second case study examines Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which operates in coordination with European Union member states, including in the Mediterranean.
The agency supports external border management and efforts to address migration-related challenges, smuggling, and cross-border crime.
Over the years, Frontex has experienced substantial growth in its mandate, budget, and resources.
However, the study identifies a gap between increased investment and demonstrable improvements in operational effectiveness.
According to the figures presented in the article, Frontex's budget increased from approximately €93 million in 2014 to nearly €700 million in 2022. Its workforce also expanded considerably.
Despite this growth, the researchers identify persistent difficulties involving coordination, information sharing, jurisdictional responsibilities, and performance evaluation.
The article also draws on findings from a 2021 European Court of Auditors report that identified shortcomings in the agency's operations and its ability to assess their effectiveness.
Importantly, the study does not claim that all Frontex activities are ineffective. Rather, it demonstrates that increasing budgets, personnel, and formal powers does not automatically produce better maritime security outcomes.
When institutional structures are complex, responsibilities are fragmented, and coordination is insufficient, even substantial additional resources may fail to deliver the intended results.
The Solution May Begin on Land
The Solution May Begin on Land. One of the study's central findings is that maritime security challenges cannot be addressed through enforcement at sea alone.
In the Strait of Malacca, the researchers emphasize the importance of coastal communities and the influence of socioeconomic conditions on maritime crime.
In the European case, they highlight the need for closer cooperation with countries of origin and transit in addressing irregular migration, alongside better coordination between maritime and land-based activities.
The implication is that maritime security requires an integrated approach that treats the sea and land as interconnected spaces of risk, governance, and strategic interests.
According to the researchers, investing in maritime enforcement mechanisms without addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity may yield limited results.
Beyond Traditional Sovereignty: Rethinking Maritime Governance
The study's conclusions go beyond a general call for increased cooperation between states.
Dayan and Rubin advocate examining governance approaches that transcend traditional sovereign boundaries, emphasizing regional coordination, effective allocation of responsibilities, and simpler management and enforcement structures.
Their discussion of post-sovereign governance seeks to adapt maritime governance to a reality in which threats, resources, and strategic interests extend beyond the jurisdiction of individual states.
A particularly important element of their argument is strategic simplification.
Rather than continually adding institutions, regulations, and coordination mechanisms, the researchers propose examining how overlapping responsibilities can be reduced, cooperation improved, and operational structures made clearer and more effective.
In the European context, they suggest more effective centralization of resources and responsibilities and closer integration among maritime law enforcement bodies.
The proposed approach does not disregard the importance of states or their security interests. Instead, it calls for reconsidering how authority and responsibility should be organized to address shared challenges more effectively.
What Does This Mean for Israel's Maritime Security?
Although the research focuses on the Strait of Malacca and Frontex, its findings are relevant to broader geostrategic discussions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean.
For Israel, the maritime domain is essential to foreign trade, energy supplies, and strategic infrastructure.
Protecting shipping routes, ports, and offshore infrastructure requires advanced national capabilities, but maritime security may also be affected by developments and threats beyond national borders.
From this perspective, the study offers an important analytical framework: maritime security should not be assessed solely by the number of vessels deployed, the size of budgets, or the strength of enforcement capabilities.
It also depends on understanding the origins of threats, coordinating among relevant actors, and developing responses suited to the regional environment.
These implications represent a potential application of the study's conceptual findings rather than conclusions derived from a direct examination of Israel.
The Researchers of Tomorrow: Eleanor Dayan, Arnon Soffer Scholarship Recipient
Eleanor Dayan is a recipient of the 2024 Arnon Soffer Doctoral Scholarship, awarded as part of the activities of the Chaikin Institute for Geostrategy at the University of Haifa.
Her research, conducted in collaboration with Prof. Aviad Rubin of the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa and published in Marine Policy, examines the intersection of sovereignty, governance, and maritime security.
The article explicitly acknowledges financial support from the Chaikin Institute for Geostrategy at the University of Haifa. The study demonstrates how geostrategic analysis can illuminate the relationships among political structures, socioeconomic conditions, and security mechanisms, while offering new approaches to complex international challenges.
The Chaikin Institute for Geostrategy congratulates Eleanor Dayan on the publication of her research and her academic achievements, and wishes her continued success in her research career.
Arnon Soffer Doctoral Scholarship for the 2026–2027 Academic Year
The Arnon Soffer Doctoral Scholarship supports researchers working in fields relevant to the Chaikin Institute for Geostrategy and encourages the development of the next generation of scholars.
The application deadline for the Arnon Soffer Doctoral Scholarship for the 2026–2027 academic year is December 1, 2026.
For scholarship details, eligibility requirements, and application instructions - enter the page.
Read the scientific article: Eleanor Dayan and Prof. Aviad Rubin, Marine Policy.
